Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the relation between bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and MBS prices. Theory suggests feedback between MBS holdings and underlying asset markets can be aggravated by mark-to-market accounting. We measure feedback by the relation between asset returns and the changes in bank MBS holdings. Consistent with the existence of feedback effects related to mark-to-market, we find that for banks with high MBS, more nonperforming loans, and lower total capital ratio, changes in bank MBS positions are positively associated with changes in MBS prices and that this relation is reduced after the April 2009 mark-to-market rule clarification. To assess the effect of feedback on shareholder value, we test whether the stock-price response of banks to the announcement of the mark-to-market accounting rule clarification is associated with the intensity of feedback behavior. We find that the stock market reaction to the rule change is more positive for banks with more MBS, higher nonperforming loans and higher pre-rule-change feedback. We also find positive bond-price reactions to the rule change. Overall, our results suggest feedback related to mark-to-market accounting had a measurable effect on shareholder value.

We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.

We investigate the joint hypothesis that (1) tax expense contains information about core profitability that is incremental to reported earnings and (2) that information is reflected in stock prices with a delay. We find that seasonally differenced quarterly tax expense, our proxy for tax expense surprise, is related positively to future returns. This anomaly is separate from previously documented pricing anomalies based on financial and tax variables. Additional investigation reveals that tax expense surprise is related positively to changes in future quarterly earnings and tax expense, and both those future changes are related positively to future returns. While the returns to investing in predictable future earnings changes has been documented before, these results suggest that predicting changes in future tax expense also generates incremental future returns.

We document a counter‐intuitive finding regarding analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (EPS): magnitudes of deviations from benchmarks—individual forecasts versus consensus (dispersion) and consensus versus actual (forecast error)—do not vary with scale. Seasonally differenced EPS, or time‐series forecast error, also exhibits substantial lack of variation with scale, but only for firms followed by analysts. This lack of variation with scale is not observed for analyst and time‐series forecasts for (a) EPS for some countries, (b) sales and cash flows for all countries, and (c) stock splits. We propose and investigate different explanations for these puzzling regularities that have important implications for practice and research. We believe the cause is managerial smoothing of EPS designed to reduce across‐firm variation in EPS volatility.

I examine how verification of financial statements influences debt pricing. I use a large proprietary database of privately held U.S. firms, an important business sector in which the information environment is opaque and financial statement audits are not mandated. I find that audited firms have a significantly lower cost of debt and that lenders place more weight on audited financial information in setting the interest rate. Further, I provide evidence of a mechanism for this increased financial statement usefulness: accruals from audited financial statements are better predictors of future cash flows. Collectively, I provide novel evidence that audited financial statements are more informative and that this significantly influences lenders’ decisions.

We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm-level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm-initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.

Accruals correlate closely with the determinants of the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels. The common component of firm‐level accruals, which cannot be diversified away by aggregation, explains the positive relation between aggregate accruals and future stock market returns. The residual component, which accounts for most variation in firm‐level accruals, is responsible for the negative cross‐sectional relation between firm‐level accruals and future stock returns. Consistent with the risk‐based explanation, aggregate accruals, as a proxy for the conditional equity premium, forecast changes in aggregate economic activity. Moreover, we document a similar comovement of earnings with the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels, which helps explain the negative relation between changes in aggregate earnings and contemporaneous market returns.

Moods are low-intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision-makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16-measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark-consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight-measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.

This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.

Investors, regulators, academics, and researchers all emphasize the importance of financial statement comparability. However, an empirical construct of comparability is typically not specified. In addition, little evidence exists on the benefits of comparability to users. This study attempts to fill these gaps by developing a measure of financial statement comparability. Empirically, this measure is positively related to analyst following and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to analysts? dispersion in earnings forecasts. These results suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of information available to analysts about the firm.