Knowledge that Transforms

The impact of R&D on growth through spillovers has been a major topic of economic research over the last thirty years. A central problem in the literature is that firm performance is affected by two countervailing “spillovers” : a positive effect from technology (knowledge) spillovers and a negative business stealing effects from product market rivals. We develop a general framework incorporating these two types of spillovers and implement this model using measures of a firm's position in technology space and productmarket space. Using panel data on U.S. firms, we show that technology spillovers quantitatively dominate, so that the gross social returns to R&D are at least twice as high as the private returns. We identify the causal effect of R&D spillovers by using changes in federal and state tax incentives for R&D. We also find that smaller firms generate lower social returns to R&D because they operate more in technological niches. Finally, we detail the desirable properties of an ideal spillover measure and how existing approaches, including our new Mahalanobis measure, compare to these criteria.

More than 120 countries require or permit the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed companies on the basis of higher information quality and accounting comparability from IFRS application. However, the empirical evidence about these presumed benefits is often conflicting and fails to distinguish between information quality and comparability. In this paper we examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms’ information environment. We find that after mandatory IFRS adoption consensus forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms. We also find decreasing forecast errors for voluntary adopters, but this effect is smaller and not robust. Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the forecast error decrease is associated with the firm‐specific differences between local GAAP and IFRS. This finding suggests that it is IFRS adoption rather than a correlated unobservable factor that is causing forecast errors to decrease. Exploiting individual analyst level data and isolating settings where analysts would benefit more from either increased comparability or higher quality information, we document that the improvement in the information environment is driven both by information and comparability effects. These results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption has improved the quality of information intermediation in capital markets, and as a result firms’ information environment, by increasing both information quality and accounting comparability.

This paper provides evidence of the impact of hedge accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on corporate risk man-agement. Using a sample of large UK non-financial firms from 2003 to 2006, we show that the implementation of the new standards reduces the level of asymmetric information faced by derivative users. Specifically, for firms that hedge under IFRS we find that analysts ’ forecast error and dispersion are significantly lower. The paper contributes to prior research on the effects of hedge accounting and on the adoption of IFRS.

The scarcity of suitable proxies for asymmetric information has impeded empirical research from providing reliable evidence on whether information risk shapes equity pricing. In reexamining this unresolved question, we rely on firms’ geographic distance from financial centers to gauge information asymmetry. We provide strong, robust evidence supporting the prediction that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer central locations, implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information asymmetry is worse. The equity pricing role of geographic proximity is economically large, with our coefficient estimates translating into firms located within 100 kilometers of the city center of the nearest of six major financial centers, or in their metropolitan statistical areas, enjoying equity financing costs that are seven basis points lower. Our inferences are insensitive to measuring both the cost of equity capital and distance in several ways, controlling for corporate governance quality, and addressing endogeneity. Collectively, our analysis suggests that investors discount the price that they pay for their securities to reflect the greater information asymmetry that ensues when firms are far from major financial centers.

How do auditors behave during periods of market euphoria? To address this question, we study auditor going-concern opinions around the time of the wave of stressed Internet companies filing to go public on Nasdaq, a period many characterize as the ‘dot com bubble’. We focus on the day the auditor signs the opinion that appears in a stressed, Internet registrants’ IPO filing and document a sharp increase in the number of opinions with dates between January 1999 and April 2000. Contemporaneous with this jump in transaction volume, and for the duration of these 16-months, Big 5 firms were less likely to render going-concern opinions to their stressed, Internet IPO registrant clients. Upon conducting tests for determinants that could lead auditors to shift their decision criteria during this euphoric audit market, we find the presence of a going-concern opinion varies with variables that proxy for client reasons (financial distress, company age, venture backing, IPO cash burn) and for less auditor independence/skepticism (recent fees for clients without venture backing and a rush-to-market for clients with venture backing) by the Big 5 firms. These findings suggest a mixed conclusion regarding the Big 5's behavior; as the presence of a going-concern opinion varies inversely with variables that proxy for both client viability and auditor self interest. As for consequences to investors, our analysis of two, three and four-year post-IPO stock delisting provides some evidence of a decrease in the predictive content (early-warning value) of Big 5 opinions signed during the Internet IPO bubble.

This paper develops a theoretical model to understand the role of accounting con- servatism in debt contracts, incorporating the possible renegotiation of debt contracts with accounting-based covenants. I find that the demand for accounting conservatism depends on whether renegotiation occurs and if so, at what cost. When the covenant is not renegotiable or when renegotiation cost is sufficiently high, more conservative accounting actually reduces the efficiency of debt contracts. When renegotiation cost is moderate, more conservative accounting may increase the entrepreneur's welfare under certain conditions, especially for firms with less promising investment opportunities and for firms with higher liquidation values. Both are characteristics of "traditional industries" characterized by low growth and high level of tangible assets in place. When renegotiation is costless, the degree of accounting conservatism becomes irrelevant and the first best liquidation is always achieved. These results call for more cross-sectional examinations on the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracts in empirical studies.

This paper investigates factors associated with high‐quality Enterprise Risk Management ( ERM ) programs in financial services firms, and whether ERM quality enhances performance and signals credibility to the financial markets. ERM , developed with the assistance of the accounting profession, provides a framework and plan to integrate management of all sources of risk. Challenged by measurement difficulties common to research on management control systems, prior ERM studies present mixed findings. Using ERM quality ratings of financial companies by Standard & Poor's, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with greater complexity, less resource constraint, and better corporate governance. Controlling for such characteristics, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with improved accounting performance. Results show a market reaction to signals of enhanced management control from initial ERM quality ratings and rating revisions, and a stronger response to earnings surprises for firms with higher ERM quality. Focusing on the recent global financial crisis, our analysis suggests that there is no relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to and during the market collapse. However, returns of higher ERM quality companies are higher during the market rebound. Overall, results reveal that firm performance and value are enhanced by high‐quality controls that integrate risk management efforts across the firm, enabling better oversight of managers' risk‐taking behavior and aligning that behavior with the strategic direction of the company.

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX ‐mandated internal control deficiency ( ICD ) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICD s during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICD s in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.

A heated debate exists as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions are indicative of earnings management. While many studies attribute discontinuities in earnings distributions to earnings management, other studies argue that earnings discontinuities are artifacts of sample selection and research design. Overall, there is limited direct evidence of a connection between earnings discontinuities and earnings management. In this study, we provide direct evidence linking earnings management to earnings discontinuities for a sample of firms that settle securities class action lawsuits and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period. We compare the distribution of restated (“unmanaged”) earnings to originally reported (“managed”) earnings. We find that discontinuities are not present in the distribution of analyst forecast errors and earnings changes using unmanaged earnings but are present using managed earnings. The discontinuity in the earnings level distribution is attenuated, but not eliminated, on an unmanaged basis. These shifts among our sample of firms are caused by earnings management and cannot be explained by sample selection or research design issues. Our findings are important because many studies use earnings discontinuities as a proxy for intentional earnings manipulations and we provide the first direct evidence of a link between these two phenomena.

Do political connections add value to audit firms? Evidence from IPO audits in China