Knowledge that Transforms

Information asymmetry in financial markets relates to the idea that one party to a transaction has better information than the other. Since financial reporting involves the transmission of value relevant enterprise information, we investigate whether the quality of reported earnings can contribute to differentially informed financial market participants. Higher information asymmetry is costly as it increases the adverse selection risk for market participants and lowers liquidity. For a large sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms, we show that (i) poor earnings quality is significantly and incrementally associated with higher information asymmetry, (ii) earnings quality disproportionately affects information asymmetry for firms with poor information environments, (iii) both innate and discretionary components of earnings quality increase information asymmetry, and (iv) poor earnings quality exacerbates the information asymmetry around earnings announcements. Our results suggest that the standard setters’ efforts to develop accounting standards that improve earnings quality should contribute to a better information environment for market participants and increase stock liquidity.

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility ( vega ) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price ( delta ). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega ( delta ) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB−) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta . Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta ) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.

This paper examines the determinants and economic efficiency of corporate voluntary disclosure. The focus is on the trade-off for an individual firm when the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure stem from the consequences of its investment decisions and the impact on its share price. Investment and voluntary disclosure decisions are intertwined. First, voluntary disclosure leads to more accurate pricing, which induces more efficient investment decisions. Second, the firm may affect the market pricing in its favor by strategically disclosing or withholding its private information. This opportunistic use of disclosure may cause the real investment to be distorted at the margin. My analysis shows that the efficiency of voluntary disclosure is influenced by both effects. Further, this paper investigates how the investment efficiency and the propensity for providing voluntary disclosure respond to various environmental variables. Two such key variables are the general economic outlook of the investment opportunity and the quality of firm private information.

This study examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability. U.K. domestic standards are considered very similar to IFRS , suggesting any capital market benefits observed for U.K.‐domiciled firms are more likely attributable to improvements in comparability (i.e., better precision of across ‐firm information) than to changes in information quality specific to the firm (i.e., core information quality). If IFRS adoption improves financial statement comparability, we predict this should reduce insiders' ability to benefit from private information. Consistent with these expectations, we find that abnormal returns to insider purchases ― used to proxy for private information ― are reduced following IFRS adoption. Similar results obtain across numerous subsamples and proxies used to isolate IFRS effects attributable to comparability. Together, the findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption improving comparability and thus leading to capital market benefits by reducing insiders' ability to exploit private information.

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family owners leads to the alleviation of agency conflicts, but the power of family CEOs leads to potential family entrenchment.

We study whether Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made cross-listed firms less opaque via an examination of analyst earnings forecasts. To test this, we compare European Union (EU) firms that are cross-listed in the US—and therefore subject to S404—with comparable EU firms that are not cross listed. We find that while both types of firms experienced a decrease in opaqueness over time, this decrease was significantly larger for cross-listed firms. Our results are robust to accounting for concurrent sell-side analyst regulations in the US, delistings, and changes in corporate risk taking. Overall, our analysis suggests that SOX had a positive effect on corporate disclosure quality.

Evidence suggests that the negotiated wage for a unionized employee group is an increasing function of the firm’s prior profitability. As a result, managers may have an incentive to strategically signal a negative outlook to their unionized workers in order to improve the firm’s bargaining position. I assess the strategy of missing mean consensus analysts’ earnings estimates as a way for managers to signal a negative outlook to their unionized employees. I find that unionized firms are more likely to miss estimates than their nonunionized counterparts. Additionally, this propensity to miss estimates is increasing in both the firm’s percentage of unionized employees and multiunionism, but is unaffected by the timing of the signal relative to contract renewal. Finally, the increased propensity to miss estimates appears to be driven by both differences in expectations management and earnings management across the two groups. Specifically, managers of unionized firms take less action than their nonunionized counterparts to guide forecasts downward when estimates are too high, and they take more action to deflate earnings when expectations are too low. Taken together, the findings suggest that managers do seek to project a negative outlook to their unions, and that this tendency is increasing in the union’s negotiation strength.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 introduced integrated audits of internal control over financial reporting and the financial statements. Since the internal control and audit reports are joint products of the audit process, we examine whether the issuance of an internal control material weakness opinion (MWO) influences, other things equal, the issuance of a going concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a sample of financially stressed companies, we find that the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of a GCO, suggesting that auditors do respond to the uncertainty surrounding a MWO by issuing a GCO. Further analyses reveal that the positive association between MWO and GCO obtains for company-level material weaknesses, which are known to be difficult to “audit-around”, and for more litigious industries. We also compare these results with those for a Section 302 sample with manager-reported (but not audited) material weaknesses, and find that the material weakness reported under Section 302 does not impact the GCO. Hence, the auditors respond to the uncertainty surrounding material weaknesses only when they issue MWOs, and not due to the existence of material weaknesses per se – that is, the issuance of a MWO seems to induce further conservatism in the auditor’s GCO decision. We conclude that researchers and policymakers should consider the overall effect of Section 404 on the financial statement audit.

This study investigates experimentally how mutual monitoring affects effort when employees are compensated via rank‐order tournaments. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that mutual monitoring may either decrease effort by facilitating collusion or increase effort by stimulating competition. In our first experiment, we find that mutual monitoring increases effort, because participants do not attempt to collude but rather behave competitively. This result leads us to expand our theory and develop hypotheses to predict that the effect of mutual monitoring depends on whether employees have the inclination to collude or compete. Specifically, we predict that mutual monitoring decreases effort when employees are inclined to collude and increases effort when employees are inclined to compete; that is, mutual monitoring will not change the basic inclination created by the workplace setting, but will “turn up the volume” on the effect that such inclination has on effort. Consistent with our predictions, our second experiment finds that mutual monitoring leads to lower effort when participants have a collusive inclination and (eventually) higher effort when they have a competitive inclination. Overall, the results from these two experiments suggest that allowing employees to observe each other's productive effort in tournament incentive settings may have positive or negative consequences for the firm, depending on whether environmental factors predispose employees to collude or compete.