Knowledge that Transforms

Many subjects in lab experiments exhibit small-stakes risk aversion, consistent with loss aversion. Those with greater math skills are less likely to show small-stakes risk aversion. We argue that departures from expected utility maximization may help explain why many firms in developing countries leave high expected return investments unexploited. We show that among a sample of Kenyan shopkeepers, inventories are negatively associated with small-stakes risk aversion and positively associated with math skills.

Previous evaluations of Job Corps document disparate effects on the earnings of adolescents (aged 16-19) and young adults (aged 20-24). These are conjectured to be due to differential human capital accumulation within the program between these groups. If correct, the effect of the program on wages should be larger than that on earnings, since wages more accurately reflect human capital. We estimate bounds on average and quantile treatment effects of Job Corps on wages and find that the relative effects on both outcomes are similar, casting some doubt on the conjecture that human capital is driving the disparate effects.

Economies at early stages of development are frequently shaken by large changes in growth rates, whereas advanced economies tend to experience relatively stable growth rates. To explain this pattern, we propose a model of technological diversification. Production makes use of input-varieties that are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. Endogenous variety adoption by firms raises average productivity and provides diversification benefits against variety-specific shocks. Firm-level and aggregate volatility thus decline as a by-product of the development process. We quantitatively assess the model's predictions and find that it can generate patterns of volatility and development consistent with the data.

Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators.

We conducted a field experiment in Southern Ghana to test the effect of asymmetric information on intrahousehold allocation. A lottery was conducted, where prizes were distributed in public and in private. The results indicate that asymmetric information over windfalls has a differential effect on observable and concealable expenses, consistent with hiding. Husbands' public windfalls increase investment in assets and social capital, while there is no such effect when wives win. Private windfalls of both spouses are committed to cash (wives) or in-kind gifts (husband) which are either difficult to monitor or to reverse if discovered by the other spouse.

Recent theories of firm heterogeneity emphasize between-firm wage differences as a new mechanism through which trade can affect wage inequality. Using linked employer-employee data for Sweden, we show that many of the stylized facts about wage inequality found in Helpman et al. (2012) for Brazil also hold for Sweden. Much of overall wage inequality arises within sector-occupations and for workers with similar observable characteristics. One notable difference is a smaller contribution from between-firm differences in wages in Sweden, which could reflect the influence of Swedish labor market institutions in dampening the scope for variation in wages between firms through collective wage agreements.

British Master and Servant law made employee contract breach a criminal offense until 1875. We develop a contracting model generating equilibrium contract breach and prosecutions, then exploit exogenous changes in output prices to examine the effects of labor demand shocks on prosecutions. Positive shocks in the textile, iron, and coal industries increased prosecutions. Following the abolition of criminal sanctions, wages differentially rose in counties that had experienced more prosecutions, and wages responded more to labor demand shocks. Coercive contract enforcement was applied in industrial Britain; restricted mobility allowed workers to commit to risk-sharing contracts with lower, but less volatile, wages.

We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence critically depends on payoffs from the job, which implies that the effectiveness of election may vary substantially across public offices. Third, reelection incentives may discourage judges with significant human capital from holding office.

How large are spatial barriers to transferring knowledge? We analyze the international operations of multinational firms to answer this fundamental question. In our model firms can transfer bits of knowledge to their foreign affiliates in either embodied (traded intermediates) or disembodied form (direct communication). Knowledge transfer costs interact with the knowledge intensity of production to determine the geographic structure of multinationals' input sourcing as well as its competitiveness in foreign markets. The model shows how data on observable trade costs and features of multinationals'global operations reveal the size and nature of knowledge transfer costs. Our empirical analysis confirms the model's predictions using firm-level data, quantifies the aggregate implications of the model for the structure of multinationals' operations, and demonstrates that transfer costs shape the knowledge content of intra-firm trade flows.

Calls for benefit-cost analysis in rule-making, based on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, have revealed a paucity of work on allocative efficiency in financial markets. We propose three principles to help fill this gap. First, we highlight the need for quantifying the statistical cost of a crisis to trade off the risk of a crisis against loss of growth during good times. Second, we propose a framework quantifying the social value of price discovery, and highlighting which arbitrages are over- and under-supplied from a social perspective. Finally, we distinguish between insurance benefits and gambling-facilitation harms of market completion.