This paper attempts to provide microfoundations for the knowledge production function in an idea-based growth model. Production of new ideas is made a function of newly reconfigured old ideas in the spirit of the way an agricultural research station develops improved plant varieties by cross-pollinating existing plant varieties. The model shows how knowledge can build upon itself in a combinatoric feedback process that may have significant implications for economic growth. The paper's main theme is that the ultimate limits to growth lie not so much in our ability to generate new ideas as in our ability to process an abundance of potentially new ideas into usable form.

A canonical price-normalized form is proposed as a generalization of the ordinary consumer's surplus expression commonly used to evaluate changes in economic welfare. This familiar-looking formula, it is proved, can be rigorously interpreted as representing the first- and second-order terms of a Taylor-series expansion for the equivalent-variation or willingness-to-pay function of a single consumer. In principle, the lowly consumer's surplus triangle-and-rectangle methodology can be rigorously defended as an exact approximation to a theoretically meaningful measure as long as prices are appropriately deflated. The appropriate price deflator is derived, and some implications are discussed.

This paper uses issuance-level data to study how equity capital inflows that enter emerging market economies affect equity issuance and corporate investment. It shows that foreign inflows are strongly correlated with country-level issuance. The relation especially reflects the behavior of large firms. To identify supply-side shocks, capital inflows into each country are instrumented with exogenous changes in other countries’ attractiveness to foreign investors. Shifts in the supply of foreign capital are important drivers of increased equity inflows. Instrumented contemporaneous and lagged capital inflows lead large firms to raise new equity, which they use to fund investment.

The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regulatory constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk. Using a large international sample of banks this paper shows that banks located in high-tax countries have higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. This trade-off is stronger when regulation is more stringent and for banks with less capital. Non-financial firms' leverage and asset risk are positively related to tax rates, as further evidence of the regulatorily induced adjustment of portfolio risk. A difference-in-difference analysis provides support for a causal interpretation of these results. Overall, higher tax rates are positively correlated with systemic risk, suggesting that the lower asset risk does not offset the risk-inducing effect of tax rates on bank leverage.

We examine changes in the disclosure behavior of firms involved in 827 disclosure-related class-action securities litigation cases filed between 1996 and 2005. We find no evidence that the firms in our sample respond to the litigation event by increasing or improving their disclosures to investors. Rather, we find consistent evidence that firms reduce the level of information provided post-litigation. Our results suggest that the litigation process encourages firms to decrease the provision of disclosures for which they may later be held accountable, despite the increased protections afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Return models (returns regressed on scaled earnings variables) are commonly preferred to price models (stock price regressed on earnings per share). We provide a framework for choosing between these models. An economically intuitive rationale suggests that price models are better specified in that the estimated slope coefficients from price models, but not return models, are unbiased. Our empirical results confirm that price models' earnings response coefficients are less biased. However, return models have less serious econometric problems than price models. In some research contexts the combined use of both price and return models may be useful.

Publisher Copyright: © 2026 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

In recognition of the severe consequences of the recent international financial crisis, the topic of macroprudential policy has elicited considerable research effort. The present study constructs, for 46 economies around the globe, an index of the capacity to deploy macroprudential policies. Building on elements that have been the subject of recent research, we develop an index that aims to represent the essence of what constitutes a macroprudential regime. Specifically, the index quantifies: (1) how existing macroprudential frameworks are organized; and (2) how far a particular jurisdiction is from reaching the goals established by the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The latter is a benchmark that has not been considered in the burgeoning literature that seeks to quantify the role of macroprudential policies.

We propose life history (LH) theory as an overarching theoretical explanation of CEO preferences and decision-making. LH theory has the potential to integrate prior research on variation in top executives’ impact on decision outcomes and to demonstrate how observable differences in behavior can be explained by evolutionary drivers. According to LH theory, individuals pursue fast or slow LH strategies. Fast individuals tend to follow accelerated reproduction strategies and engage in impulsive, opportunistic, and risk-seeking behavior. We theorize how CEO LH strategies shape both on-the-job and off-the-job decisions and thus add to a growing body of research on evolutionary drivers of preferences and decision-making in accounting. We measure CEO LH strategies based on biodemographic micro-data related to reproductive behavior. Our findings linked to on-the-job decisions suggest that firms managed by CEOs who pursue fast LH strategies exhibit more financial irregularities, lower accounting conservatism, and higher earnings management. Findings related to CEO off-the-job decisions show that fast CEOs are more likely to engage in criminal behavior and to have a higher conspicuous consumption and a higher personal leverage. By applying an LH theory lens, we reconcile and advance prior fragmented research on CEO preferences by showing a clear theoretical link between on-the-job and off-the-job decisions.