We assemble a new, quarterly panel dataset that links firms’ investment and financing to their employment and wages. In the data, wages and leverage are negatively related, both cross-sectionally and within firms. This pattern contradicts models in which firms insure workers against unemployment risk. We reconcile this fact with a model that integrates factor adjustment frictions and wage bargaining with costly external financing. In the model, the probability of default rises with debt. Because default incurs deadweight costs, the expected surplus over which firms and workers bargain falls, thus depressing wages. We show that raising financing costs reduces employment and wages, in line with recent reduced-form evidence.

We analyze the impact of bank internationalization on domestic market power (Lerner index) and risk for German banks. Risk is measured by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is distressed. We distinguish the volume of foreign assets, the number of foreign countries, and different modes of foreign entry. Our analysis has three main results. First, higher market power is associated with lower risk. Second, holding assets in many countries reduce market power at home, but banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power. Third, bank internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk.

This study separates trading volume into buyer- and seller-initiated activities and examines the directional volume reaction in small and large trades to different types of earnings news. ‘Good’ (‘bad’) news triggers brief, but intense, buying (selling) in the large trades. However, a persistent period of unusually high buying activity is observed in the small trades irrespective of the news. This anomalous proclivity of small traders to buy is robust across firm size, trading volume, and different earnings expectation models. Several explanations are discussed, although the behavior does not seem fully explained by existing theories.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109) allows firms to use their discretion to set arbitrarily high valuation allowances against deferred tax assets. Firms can then later use these "hidden reserves" to manage earnings. Our evidence indicates that most banks do not record a valuation allowance to manage earnings, but rather to follow the guidelines of SFAS No. 109. However, if the bank is sufficiently well capitalized to absorb the current‐period impact on capital, then the amount of the valuation allowance increases with a bank's capital. In later years, bank managers adjust the valuation allowance to smooth earnings. The magnitude of the discretionary adjustment increases with the deviation of unadjusted earnings from the forecast or historical earnings.

The research examines accountants' and managers' perceptions of management accounting roles under conditions of centralisation and decentralisation of the management accounting function. Decentralization was associated with greater interaction between accountants and other managers and with the provision of accounting information perceived as being more pertinent to managerial needs. However, whatever the structural relationship, there were criticisms of the accountants' passivity in management. Contrary to expectations neither interpersonal relationships nor excessive power of accountants were problematical, nor did many accountants show bureaucratic orientations. Their inability to meet service expectations were perhaps, related to ambiguity and stress emanating from the accounting workflows.

We use Call Report data to examine the effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the PPP Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) on small business and farm lending by individual commercial banks. As program participation was associated with small business lending, we adopt an instrumental variables approach to identify causal implications based on historical bank relationships with the Small Business Administration and the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Our results indicate that both programs encouraged lending growth over the first half of 2020. However, while the PPP encouraged greater lending across all banks, only small and medium-sized bank lending growth was significantly related to participation in the PPPLF.

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

This paper develops a model of price determination in insurance markets. Insurance is provided by firms that are subject to default risk. Demand for insurance is inversely related to insurer default risk and is imperfectly price elastic because of information asymmetries and private information in insurance markets. The model predicts that the price of insurance, measured by the ratio of premiums to discounted losses, is inversely related to insurer default risk and that insurers have optimal capital structures. Price may increase or decrease following a loss shock that depletes the insurer's capital, depending on factors such as the effect of the shock on the price elasticity of demand. Empirical tests using firm-level data support the hypothesis that the price of insurance is inversely related to insurer default risk and provide evidence that prices declined in response to the loss shocks of the mid-1980s.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G22, G32, G33.

Institutional investors affected by hurricanes subsequently support environmental proposals in non-affected firms even if they never voted for similar initiatives. Affected investors raise their holdings in firms where their pro-environment votes are consequential. The increased voting support after hurricanes has real effects as environmental proposals endorsed by more hurricane-afflicted investors are more likely to pass. Moreover, both market capitalization and analysts’ recommendations decline after firms pass environmental proposals. Our evidence suggests that natural disasters raise institutional investors’ concerns about the environment and about potential fund flow disruptions. These concerns, in turn, influence environmental activism, corporate policies, and firm performance.