Knowledge that Transforms

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An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

There is often evidence of confusion between two forms of the constant percentage learning curve model: the cumulative average and the individual unit forms. Failure to distinguish between the two models can lead to their misuse and to potentially serious errors of estimation. A precise statement of the difference between the two clarifies the errors of misspecification. This note provides an analytical comparsion of the two models and addresses empirical estimation issues. Résumé. On a souvent la preuve de la confusion entre deux formules de modèle de la courbe d'apprentissage à pourcentage constant: celle de la moyenne cumulative et celle de l'unité individuelle. Le fait de ne pas distinguer les deux modèles peut conduire à une mauvaise utilisation et éventuellement à de sérieuses erreurs d'estimation. Un examen précis de la différence entre les deux peut clarifier les erreurs de spécification. Cet article présente une comparaison analytique des deux modèles et traite des questions d'estimation empirique.

In this paper we provide a model of the underwritten offerings of new shares of seasoned securities. Our purpose is to explain why the offering price chosen by the underwriter is lower than the market price of the firm's shares. Our model recognizes the interdependence between the markets surrounding the announcement and sale of the new issue and recognizes as well the effect which asymmetric information regarding investor demands has upon the prices in these markets.

This paper measures the effects on stock proces of corporate investments in 5% or more of another company's equity securities. Such investments initiate a process that may end with a takeover, targeted repurchase, takeover by a third party, or sale of the shares. The total valuation effect of the investment for acquiring and target firms includes returns at disclosure of the investment position, the outcome announcement, and related intervening events. For example, the positive return for target firms at initial disclosure of the investment more than offsets the negative return at a targeted repurchase.

We investigate stock market rationality by examining the timeliness and unbiasedness of the market's response to dividend announcements. Our initial findings for market timeliness show a sluggish market reaction to dividend announcements; however, when the ex-dividend effect is controlled for, we find no evidence of a sluggish market reaction. We examine the unbiasedness of the market's response by testing whether the net announcement effect across a sample that is devoid of ex-post selection bias sums to zero. We observe a significant positive net announcement effect and examine several plausible conjectures for this puzzling phenomenon, but none provides a satisfactory explanation.

Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's ‘talents’ and decision-making responsibility, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement.

Municipal bonds, Spending rate, Riskiness of Municipal bonds, Information content

LIFO, Inventory accounting method, Executive compensation, Accounting method changes