Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines household fertility and female labor supply over the life cycle. We investigate how maternal time inputs, market expenditures on offspring, as well as the benefits they yield their parents, vary with ages of offspring, and influence female labor supply and contraceptive behavior. Our econometric framework combines a female labor supply model and a contraceptive choice index function. It also accounts for the fact that conceptions are not perfectly controllable events. Using longitudinal data on married couples from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate these equations and test alternative specifications of the technologies governing chld care. Our findings suggest that while parents cannot perfectly control conceptions, variations in child care costs do affect the life cycle spacing of births. Furthermore, our results demonstrate the gains of modelling the linkages between female labor supply and fertility behavior at the household level.

A two-period model of managerial task assignment is developed, where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager, while outside employers can observe only the assign ments. Optimal contracts are rigid, but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient. The author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e. As a consequence, the model has the appealing property of small ab ility-based wage differentials within a task, as well as large ones b etween tasks. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

The author proves several versions of the second welfare theorem for exchange economies with non convex preferences. One theorem asserts that, given a Pareto optimum f, one can find income transfers and a Walrasian quasiequilibrium g s uch that all but k agents are indifferent between f and g, where k is the number of commodities. Another theorem shows that, with probabil ity one in a particular formulation of a random sequence of economies , every Pareto optimum is close to a Walrasian equilibrium with incom e transfers. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

The paper provides an intertemporal version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe and Lintner. Although we allow for general changes in the investment opportunity set and for general risk-averse preferences, there are conditions under which two mutual funds are sufficient to generate all optimal portfolios. In particular, we require that the Riesz claim, which represents the date O pricing functional for the marketed claims, should lie in a scalar Brownian information set. Then we obtain an instantaneous counterpart to the CAPM pricing formula: a linear relationship between the conditional mean returns on the securities and conditional covariances with the return on the market portfolio. Our use of option pricing techniques requires continuous trading but does not require continuous consumption. In addition, we consider a large economy with a factor structure, as in Ross' arbitrage pricing theory. The dividends are assumed to have an approximate factor structure, with the factor components lying in the information set generated by an N-dimensional Brownian motion, and with the covariance matrices of the idiosyncratic components having uniformly bounded eigenvalues. We obtain an N-factor version of the pricing formula and relate the factors to the gains processes {price change plus accumulated dividends) for well-diversified portfolios. An approximate factor structure for dividends implies an approximate factor structure for the gains processes of the securities. Furthermore, the assumption_that per.capita supply is well diversified can motivate our condition that the Riesz claim lies in an N-dimensional Brownian information set.

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ABSTRACT A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory—including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion‐based incentive systems, the absence of up‐front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic—focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.