Knowledge that Transforms

Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of nonoil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their nonoil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in nonoil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms’ capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.

In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most “informationally efficient” prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showing that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are strong‐form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also suggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment efficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternative institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.

Firm sizes and book-to-market ratios are both highly correlated with the average returns of common stocks. Fama and French (1993) argue that the association between these characteristics and returns arise because the characteristics are proxies for nondiversifiable factor risk. In contrast, the evidence in this article indicates that the return premia on small capitalization and high book-to-market stocks does not arise because of the comovements of these stocks with pervasive factors. It is the characteristics rather than the covariance structure of returns that appear to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns.

This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so‐called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a 5‐year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk‐based explanation for the return differential.

Financial economists have long debated whether monetary policy is neutral. This article addresses this question by examining how stock return data respond to monetary policy shocks. Monetary policy is measured by innovations in the federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves, by narrative indicators, and by an event study of Federal Reserve policy changes. In every case the evidence indicates that expansionary policy increases ex‐post stock returns. Results from estimating a multi‐factor model also indicate that exposure to monetary policy increases an asset's ex‐ante return.

Lawrence Kryzanowski, Simon Lalancette, Minh Chau To, Performance Attribution using an APT with Prespecified Macrofactors and Time-Varying Risk Premia and Betas, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 205-224

We formalize the effects of an earnings disclosure on security prices under an assumption of limited liability. We derive various nonlinear relations between equity prices and earnings under a variety of capital structure assumptions and. if possible, we tie the relations attained to results from the existing empirical literature. We also characterize how debt prices respond to earnings when holders of debt have limited liability. Finally, we analyze how changes in the degree of leverage and conversion features of debt affect the relation between price and earnings.

This study extends prior research on the average level of moral development in public accounting by examining five large accounting firms and three staff levels. The research is important because it highlights the need to include auditors from several firms in research designs, provides evidence of differences in moral development among public accounting firms, and profiles the professions' average level of moral development for three levels. The data are from 494 managers and seniors (204 females and 290 males) from five Big Six firms. Using the Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979a) to measure moral development, several results were noted. First, the results indicate a difference in the average level of moral development among firms, suggesting that use of subjects from only one firm inhibits the generalizability of findings regarding moral development. Second, female managers are at a significantly higher average level of moral development than male managers. In fact, the average scores for male managers fell between those expected for senior high school and college students. The data suggest that a greater percentage of high‐moral‐development males and low‐moral‐development females are leaving public accounting than their respective opposites. These results indicate that the profession has retained, through advancement, males who are potentially less sensitive to the ethical implications of various issues. The analysis also indicates that Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development is not biased towards the thought processes of males because female auditors did not score lower on the Defining Issues Test.