Knowledge that Transforms

This study demonstrates the impact of systematic risk on the prices of individual equity options. The option prices are characterized by the level and slope of implied volatility curves, and the systematic risk is measured as the proportion of systematic variance in the total variance. Using daily option quotes on the S, and P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks, we show that after controlling for the underlying asset's total risk, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. Thus, systematic risk proportion can help differentiate the price structure across individual equity options.

We present a dynamic contracting model in which the principal and the agent disagree about the resolution of uncertainty, and we illustrate the contract design in an application with Bayesian learning. The disagreement creates gains from trade that the principal realizes by transferring payment to states that the agent considers relatively more likely, a shift that changes incentives. In our dynamic setting, the interaction between incentive provision and learning creates an intertemporal source of "disagreement risk" that alters optimal risk sharing. An endogenous regime shift between economies with small and large belief differences is present, and an early shock to beliefs can lead to large persistent differences in variable pay even after beliefs have converged. Under risk-neutrality, "selling the firm" to the agent does not implement the first-best outcome because it precludes state-contingent trades.

Motivated by the insight of Keynes (1936) on the importance of higher-order beliefs in financial markets, we examine the role of such beliefs in generating drift in asset prices. We show that in a dynamic setting, a higher-order difference of opinions is necessary for heterogeneous beliefs to generate price drift. Such drift does not arise in standard difference of opinion models, since investors' beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge. Our results stand in contrast to those of Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) and others, as we argue that in rational expectation equilibria, heterogeneous beliefs do not lead to price drift.

I propose a continuous-time model of price formation in a market where trading is conducted according to a limit-order book. Strategic liquidity traders arrive randomly in the market and dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off execution price with waiting costs. I prove the existence of a Markov equilibrium in which the bid and ask prices depend only on the numbers of buy and sell orders in the book, and which can be characterized in closed-form in several cases of interest. My model generates empirically verified implications for the shape of the limit-order book and the dynamics of prices and trades. In particular, I show that buy and sell orders can cluster away from the bid-ask spread, thus generating a hump-shaped limit-order book. Also, following a market buy order, both the ask and bid prices increase, with the ask increasing more than the bid—hence the spread widens.

We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank's chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase their chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. If recent regulatory reforms compromise this entry mechanism, they may have the unintended consequence of diminishing competition among securities underwriters.

We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in corporate policies are systematically related to differences in firm performance. We study potential sources of the heterogeneity and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.

We present evidence on the benefits of changes in control from mergers and acquisitions. We find that the stronger the acquirer's shareholder rights relative to the target's, the higher the synergy created by an acquisition. This result supports the hypothesis that acquisitions of firms with poor corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate higher total gains. We also find that the synergy effect of corporate governance is shared by target shareholders and acquiring shareholders, in that both target returns and acquirer returns increase with the shareholder-rights difference between the acquirer and the target.

This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in other countries. These findings challenge current thinking on a number of issues, ranging from the nature of the agency conflict in domestic corporations to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protections for investors around the world. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We develop a tractable and flexible stochastic volatility multifactor model of the term structure of interest rates. It features unspanned stochastic volatility factors, correlation between innovations to forward rates and their volatilities, quasi-analytical prices of zero-coupon bond options, and dynamics of the forward rate curve, under both the actual and risk-neutral measures, in terms of a finite-dimensional affine state vector. The model has a very good fit to an extensive panel dataset of interest rates, swaptions, and caps. In particular, the model matches the implied cap skews and the dynamics of implied volatilities.

We document widespread violations of stochastic dominance by one-month S&P 500 index call options market over 1986-2006. These violations imply that a trader can improve her expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade. We allow the market to be incomplete and also imperfect by introducing transaction costs and bid-ask spreads. Even though pre-crash option prices conform to the Black-Scholes-Merton model reasonably well, they are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is estimated from time-series data even with a variety of statistical adjustments. Even though there are fewer violations by OTM calls than by ITM calls, there are still substantial violations by OTM calls, contradicting the inference drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the problem primarily lies with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution. Most of the violations by post-crash options are not due to the smile being too steep: options are underpriced over 1988-1995 and overpriced over 1997-2006. The decrease in violations over the post-crash period 1988-1995 is followed by a substantial increase in violations over 1997-2006. These results do not support the hypothesis that the options market is becoming more rational over time. Current draft: November 10, 2006 JEL classification: G13 Keywords: Derivative pricing; volatility smile, incomplete markets, transaction costs; index options; stochastic dominance bounds We thank workshop participants at the German Finance Society Meetings 2004, the Bachelier 2004 Congress, the EFA 2005 Meetings, the Frontiers of Finance conference 2006, the Alberta/Calgary 2006 conference, the Universities of Chicago, Iowa, Southern California, Maryland, Texas-Austin, Torino, Utah and Concordia, Laval, New York, Princeton and St. Gallen Universities and, in particular, Yacine Ait-Sahalia, David Bates, Duke Bristow, Larry Harris, Steve Heston, Jim Hodder, Mark Loewenstein, Matthew Richardson, Jeffrey Russell, Hersh Shefrin and Greg Willard for their insightful comments and constructive criticism. We also thank Michal Czerwonko for excellent research assistance. We remain responsible for errors and omissions. Constantinides acknowledges financial support from the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago and Perrakis from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected].