Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how societal secrecy affects the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Using a large sample of 18,304 IPOs across 38 countries, we find robust evidence that IPO underpricing is positively related to societal secrecy. Additional analyses reveal that investor protection, market openness, and third-party certification moderate the effect of societal secrecy on IPO underpricing. We find that societal secrecy influences IPO underpricing through the information asymmetry, demand for control, and information cascade channels. Collectively, we show that societal secrecy exerts a strong influence on IPO underpricing globally.

The method of payment choice in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions has been the subject of much research in the finance literature. But significant changes in the economic environment of acquirers in the U.S. call into question whether known stylized facts are still valid and motivate us to undertake new empirical analyses. Using a large sample of M&A transactions spanning the last two decades, we investigate the financial constraints versus ownership dilution tradeoff that potentially drives negotiations about the method of payment (i.e., stock or cash), controlling for an extensive list of other potential determinants. The main takeaway from our analyses is that financial constraints are a dominant factor motivating acquirers to include stock (at least partially) in the method of payment package in M&A transactions in the recent period.

This paper conjectures that, just as SEO (seasoned equity offering) firms are likely to face fewer information asymmetry problems relative to IPO firms, the same applies to SECO relative to initial ECF (equity crowdfunding) campaign firms. This is mainly due to new information at a SECO - such as pre-money valuation gains – that reduces adverse selection problems. Using a sample of 709 UK ECF firms conducting a first SECO campaign over the 2011–2018 period, the probit results suggest that annualised valuation gains between the initial and SECO campaigns increases the probability of having a successful first SECO campaign but the equity offered lowers this probability. First SECO success is also related to different platform shareholder structures. The results show that the nominee model and coinvestment model dominate the direct model in terms of the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign. This is likely linked to reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems stemming from no separation between ownership and control and enhanced due diligence and monitoring capabilities.

Using global cross-firm ownership data, we find that both stock returns and cash-flow news of ownership-linked firms predict focal firm's returns for all types of ownership structures: subsidiary−parent, parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−subsidiary, and parent−parent. This effect, observed only after the establishment of cross-firm ownership, is not subsumed by focal firm or industry momentum, or alternative inter-firm relations, including customer−supplier links and shared analyst coverage. Our findings are explained by mispricing due to internal capital markets – a mechanism unique to complex ownership firms. Higher internal capital market activity among ownership-linked firms also induces larger investments and lower external financing of the focal firm.

We examine how individualism affects bank capital decisions worldwide and in the United States at the state level. Based on a sample of 7034 banks in 68 countries, we establish three major findings. First, individualism is negatively and significantly associated with bank regulatory capital, and the association is independent of the influence of formal institutional environments. Second, effective legal enforcement magnifies individualism's negative effect on bank regulatory capital. Finally, focusing on the United States, we also find that banks in individualistic states hold less regulatory capital than banks in collectivist states do. Effective state-level legal enforcement magnifies the effect of individualism. Our findings suggest that individualism constrains regulators, as regulatory guidelines or formal institutional factors operate very differently depending on the informal institutional environment.

This paper investigates whether executives with risk-seeking tendencies engage in greater tax avoidance and find that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for risk-seeking) significantly reduce firm's cash effective tax rate. Risk-seeking has a considerably stronger effect on tax avoidance compared with other commonly studied executive characteristics, including overconfidence and ability. Cross-sectional tests reveal that the baseline results are not sensitive to managerial remuneration incentives, suggesting that intrinsic incentives derived from endowed traits are not easily moderated by extrinsic motivation from compensation contracts. Additionally, we find that managerial oversight helps channel CEOs risk-seeking tendencies towards value creating tax planning endeavors. Further tests reveal that risk-seeking CEOs reduce effective tax rates only when they can engage in complex, risky, and intricate income shifting strategies. Taken together, our paper highlights the role and contexts in which risk-seeking tendencies influence corporate tax planning activities.

This paper examines the impact of early Party school education for top executives on corporate innovation using Chinese listed SOEs data during 2003–2017. We find that SOEs with top executives who get a Party school degree engage in less innovative activities with the lower number of patent application and grants. The text description of the patents applied by the company is less similar to the text description of the company's main business operation, even filed patents are less capable of improving the future performance if SOEs' executives get a Party school degree. We further find that top executives with the Party school degree affect SOEs' innovation activities mainly through the government intervention originated from covert alumni relationship with local officials, which intensifies the executives' political promotion incentive. Our results are robust after we control for other managerial background characteristics, political connection, R&D expenditure and potential endogeneity. Our paper offers first evidence on the economic consequences of Party school education in China.

We develop a dynamic model of a firm in which cash management is partially delegated to a self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost of dismissing the manager with the cost of managerial discretion over the use of liquid funds. An improvement in corporate governance quality may have a positive or a negative effect on levels and values of cash balances, depending on the source of the improvement. While a reduction of managerial entrenchment results in lower cash balances and mostly higher marginal cash values, we demonstrate that the opposite is true when the monitoring of managerial actions becomes more effective. A managerial asset substitution problem produces a novel hump-shaped relation between the firm's liquidity levels and the collective propensity of shareholders and managers to reduce cash flow risk. We also discuss the firm's risk management strategies as well as derive implications of the presence of an investment opportunity, debt financing, and shareholder activism.

We find direct evidence that sovereign default risk has a negative impact on corporate performance via a rating spillover pooling mechanism. Our results show that this adverse effect is concentrated in firms that are more likely to experience limited access to external finance following a rating downgrade. Difference-in-differences tests exploiting the heterogeneity in corporate credit ratings following sovereign rating downgrades reveal that firm performance deteriorates predominantly for sovereign bound firms with higher information asymmetry, limited financial flexibility, and those operating in countries with less developed banking systems and weaker investor protection.

We show that following the legalization of same-sex marriage across US states, mortgage applications from same-sex borrowers are more likely to be denied relative to a matched sample of different-sex borrowers. Our findings are robust to using a stacked regression design and several approaches to account for compositional changes in the pool of mortgage applicants around same-sex legalization. FinTech lenders, which rely less on human loan officers, experience no change in the denial gap. Our results highlight information frictions between loan officers and same-sex borrowers as one channel for the increased denial gap between same-sex and different-sex applications.