Knowledge that Transforms

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Greenmail payments are widely viewed as actions designed by managers to perpetuate their tenure in office. This view, which suggests that greenmail prohibitions would enhance shareholder wealth, receives mixed empirical support in this paper. The average market reaction to charter amendments prohibiting greenmail payments is weakly negative, suggesting there is a value to maintaining managerial flexibility. Nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation, however, reveals a strong positive correlation between the market reaction and the firm's abnormal stock price runup over the three months just prior to the proxy mailing date. For the subsample of firms with a relatively large prior runup, the precommitment not to pay greenmail is value enhancing. If the prior runup reflects takeover rumors, then this evidence is consistent with the proposition that greenmail payments amidst takeover speculations are value decreasing.

Cheng F. Lee, Chunchi Wu, K. C. John Wei, The Heterogeneous Investment Horizon and the Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Implications, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 361-376

An approximate method is developed for computing the values of European options on the maximum or the minimum of several assets. The method is very fast and is accurate for parameter ranges that are often of the most interest. The approach casts the problem in terms of order statistics and can be used to handle situations where the initial asset prices, the asset variances, and the covariances are all unequal. Numerical values are given to illustrate the accuracy of the method.

Abstract. This paper has two objectives: (1) providing a method to evaluate directly the costs (benefits) of knowledge spillovers arising from purchasing MAS from the incumbent auditor, and (2) examining the effect of estimates of the cost of auditor change on clients' ability to capture the resulting cost savings. The first is achieved by using self‐selection bias parameters estimated from switching regressions. The latter is based on data generated from clients' assessments of auditor change costs and the related economic conditions. For a sample of 84 companies, the results indicate that purchasing MAS from the incumbent auditor does not have a bearing on audit fees. The paper also provides an application of the Heckman‐Lee method of correcting for self‐selection bias. Résumé. L'auteur vise deux objectifs: 1) présenter une méthode permettant l'évaluation directe des coûts (et des avantages) de la mise à contribution des connaissances acquises découlant du recours aux conseils de gestion du vérificateur en titre et 2) analyser l'incidence de l'estimation des coûts que suppose un changement de vérificateur sur la capacité du client de réaliser les économies qui devraient en résulter. Pour atteindre le premier objectif, l'auteur utilise des paramètres de distorsion d'autosélection estimés à partir de la commutation de régressions. Pour atteindre le second, il se fonde sur des données produites à partir de l'évaluation par les clients des coûts que suppose le changement de vérificateur et sur la conjoncture économique qui s'y rattache. Pour un échantillon de 84 entreprises, les résultats indiquent que le recours aux conseils de gestion du vérificateur en titre n'a pas d'incidence sur les honoraires de vérification. L'auteur applique également la méthode Heckman‐Lee de correction de la distorsion d'autosélection pour évaluer les avantages de la mise à contribution des connaissances acquises.

Résumé. Les auteurs examinent dans le texte qui suit la productivité des professeurs de comptabilité canadiens en procédant au dépouillement des articles ayant paru dans 10 publications avec comité de lecture entre 1976 et 1989 inclusivement. Ils recensent le nombre d'articles rédigés par les professeurs attachés à des établissements canadiens en les classant par sujet, qu'il s'agisse de textes théoriques ou pratiques, et selon la publication dans laquelle ces articles ont paru. Les auteurs ont procédé à la compilation de statistiques sommaires permettant d'évaluer la productivité globale et la productivité par auteur dans les établissements représentés et de déterminer les 10 chercheurs qui se sont révélés les plus productifs au cours de cette période ainsi qu'au cours des périodes intermédiaires 1976–1982 et 1983–1989.

Abstract. In this paper we examine the productivity of Canadian academic accountants through analyses of articles published in 10 refereed journals between 1976 and 1989, inclusive. We report the numbers of articles by Canadian institutional affiliation cross‐tabulated by subject area, whether theoretical or empirical, and by the journal in which articles appeared. Summary statistics are computed to identify the gross and per capita productivity of the institutions represented and to identify the 10 most productive researchers in this period as well as in the subperiods 1976–82 and 1983–89.

Budget deficits implying an unbounded present value of government debt are infeasible and, hence, induce expectations of a future policy change. The authors study how expectations of a policy switch, whose timing or mix between expenditure cuts, tax increases, or increases in money growth rates may be uncertain, affect economic dynamics before the switch takes place. They are especially concerned with the correlation between changes in the deficit and inflation. Of particular interest is their finding that timing uncertainty may induce fluctuations in the rate of inflation that seem to be unrelated to the budget deficit, at a time when the budget deficit is responsible for inflation. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values. In fact, this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player's choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but, in contrast to standard repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents' realized actions.

This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections. Government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors. If different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods, the economy exhibits a deficits bias; that is, debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner. The equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re-elected.