Knowledge that Transforms

In September 2009, Thomson Reuters (TR) discontinued its practice of relying on analysts to determine the treatment of unexpected charges and gains in favor of their immediate exclusion from GAAP earnings. Adopting a difference‐in‐differences approach, we show that this plausibly exogenous change in TR's methodology resulted in street earnings that are more predictive of future performance; and timelier, more accurate, and less dispersed analyst forecasts of future earnings, consistent with TR enhancing the properties of street earnings and analyst forecasts. Finally, using path analysis we show that a significant portion of TR's effect on price discovery is through its effect on analysts; and that the change in TR's treatment of unexpected items increased (decreased) the relative influence of TR (analysts) on the pricing of street earnings. We conclude that forecast data providers like TR are more than a conduit of information from analysts to investors.

Effective financial reporting requires efficient information processing. This paper studies factors that determine efficient information processing. I exploit a unique small business lending setting where I am able to observe the entire codified demographic and accounting information set that loan officers use to make decisions. I decompose the loan officers’ decisions into a part driven by codified hard information and a part driven by uncodified soft information. I show that a machine learning model substantially outperforms loan officers in processing hard information. Loan officers can only process a sparse set of useful hard information identified by the machine learning model and focus their attention on salient signals such as large jumps in cash flows. However, the loan officers use salient hard information as “red flags” to highlight where to acquire more soft information. This result suggests that salient information is an attention allocation device: It guides humans to allocate their limited cognitive resources to acquire soft information, a task in which humans have an advantage over machines.

We examine whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 increased the information content of corporate earnings disclosures. Prior research questions whether the Act improved disclosure quality but generally relies on long‐window tests and yields mixed results. We focus on whether the Act increased earnings informativeness, improving upon prior designs by focusing on short earnings announcement windows and employing a difference‐in‐differences design to control for potential contemporaneous structural changes. We document an increase in earnings informativeness following the Act, which is larger for treatment firms (which withheld disclosure before the Act) than for control firms. The increase in informativeness is more pronounced for firms that are subject to stronger enforcement.

We examine how similarity in institutional, legal, and social characteristics between a firm's and its directors’ home countries, that is, country‐pair homophily, affects foreign director appointments. We estimate a gravity model that includes economic and geographic proximity and find that country‐pair homophily is a significant determinant of foreign director appointments to corporate boards. We also find that country‐pair homophily limits the appointments of foreign directors from high‐quality governance countries to firms located in low‐quality governance countries, which may reduce the role of board internationalization in promoting the global convergence of governance practices. We analyze changes in foreign director appointments around the international adoption of IFRS and Norway's gender‐quota rule and find a higher appointment likelihood for directors originating from countries that are institutionally and culturally similar to that of the firm. Our findings point to the critical role that country‐pair homophily plays in matching director to boards with implications for the diffusion of governance practices globally.

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk.

This paper examines whether and how individual auditors are disciplined for audit errors. Taking advantage of the long history of auditor identity data from China, we find that signing auditors with client restatements are likely to lose the privilege of signing the audit reports of public clients. However, auditors can avoid this consequence by issuing a modified audit opinion to warn of the potential misstatement. We show that auditors are more likely to be disciplined when their firms operate in less concentrated audit markets. Finally, we find positive outcomes from the disciplinary action of the audit firms. Firms that discipline their auditors for restatements have a larger decrease in the rate of client restatements and a larger increase in market share, compared to nondisciplining firms. Their clients have a higher earnings response coefficient after the disciplinary action. In summary, our results suggest that individual auditors in China can face career setbacks when they produce poor quality audits.

Using machine learning–based algorithms, we measure key impressions about sell‐side analysts using their LinkedIn photos. We find that impressions of analysts’ trustworthiness ( TRUST ) and dominance ( DOM ) are positively associated with forecast accuracy, especially after recent in‐person meetings between analysts and firm managers. High TRUST also enhances stock return sensitivity to forecast revisions, especially for stocks with high institutional ownership. In contrast, the impression of analysts’ attractiveness ( ATTRACT ) is only positively associated with accuracy for new analysts or when a firm has a new CEO or CFO. Furthermore, while high DOM helps male analysts’ chances of attaining All‐Star status, it reduces female analysts’ accuracy and the likelihood of winning the All‐Star award. In addition, the relation between TRUST and accuracy is modulated by the disclosure environment and is attenuated by Regulation Fair Disclosure. Our results suggest that face impressions influence analysts’ access to information and the perceived credibility of their reports.

We investigate real effects of a widespread corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting mandate. In 2014, the European Union (EU) passed Directive 2014/95 (hereafter, “CSR Directive”), mandating large listed EU firms to prepare annual nonfinancial reports beginning from fiscal year 2017 onward. We document that firms within the scope of the directive respond by increasing their CSR activities and that they start doing so before the entry‐into‐force of the directive. These real effects are concentrated in firms that are plausibly more strongly affected by the directive, that is, those with previously low levels of both CSR reporting and CSR activities. Using various alternative outcome variables (e.g., new CSR initiatives, improvements in CSR infrastructure, or firm performance), we show that these real effects reflect meaningful increases in CSR beyond firms’ potential attempts to “greenwash” CSR performance. Finally, we conduct tests that increase our confidence that the documented real effects are attributable to the CSR Directive and not general EU trends in CSR.

We examine the relation between incentive plans based on relative performance and competitive aggressiveness. Using data on executive incentive‐compensation contracts in large U.S. firms, we find a positive association between competitive aggressiveness and peer group overlap—that is, the extent to which two firms select each other as peers in these incentive plans. Our findings indicate that managers of such firms take more frequent as well as more complex competitive actions, relative to managers evaluated on relative performance without peer group overlap. Moreover, we show that these competitive tactics are more pronounced when managers compete against: (1) peers with similar grant sizes, (2) peers on similar performance metrics, and (3) peers in the same industry. Collectively, our findings provide evidence on how widely used incentive‐compensation practices relate to strategic firm decisions.

I provide evidence on the effects of financial audit mandates in the charitable sector, in particular their influence on donor behavior. My empirical strategy relies on variation in size‐based exemption thresholds across states and differences in size driven by the nature of charities’ activities. Consistent with audit mandates reducing donors’ reliance on charity reputation, I find audit mandates are associated with a lower concentration of donations on the largest, most well‐known charities. I show this reallocation of resources allows the charitable sector to serve more diverse geographic areas and social needs. In terms of the effect on willingness to give, I document that audit mandates are associated with a higher proportion of taxpayers who donate. However, I only observe a sizable impact on total contributions in dollars for charities with high inherent information asymmetry. Collectively, these results suggest financial audit regulation reduces information frictions and thereby affects resource allocation in the market for charitable giving.