Knowledge that Transforms

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy–the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment–can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including timevarying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with

In this paper we analyze an aggregative general equilibriiri model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint, applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods. The system is subject to both real and nxnetary shocks, which are economy-wide and observed by all. We develop methods for verifying the existence of, characterizing, and explicitly calculating equilibria. A main result of the analysis is that current money growth affects the current real allocation only insofar as it affects expectations about future money growth, i.e., only through its value as a signal.

In recent years, preferences without transitive indifference have been much discussed in consumer theory.Surprisingly, we can show that their singleton valued choice functions turn out to be indistinguishable from those of classical transitive preferences.Let 2: be a preference relation on any set X, with choice function h.We prove that J: is reflexive, total, and semitransitive (or pseudotransitive) if and only if h satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference.It follows that choice behavior generated by classical transitive preferences is indistinguishable from that generated by the more general preferences discussed in [2J, [3J, [4J, and [10J.INTRANSITIVE INDIFFERENCE AND REVEALED PREFERENCEl by

If it is common knowledge that the players in a game are Bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players' actions like any other uncertainty, then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium. Random strategies appear as an expression of each player's uncertainty about what the others will do, not as the result of willful randomization. Use is made of the common prior assumption, according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have (where "information" may be interpreted broadly, to include experience, upbringing, and genetic makeup). Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

The analogy principle proposes that population parameters be estimated by sample statistics which make known properties of the population hold as closely as possible in the sample. Applications of the analogy principle are ubiquitous. Nevertheless, estimation theory has not been studied from a consistent analog perspective. This paper makes a start.

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.

ABSTRACT One option‐pricing problem that has hitherto been unsolved is the pricing of a European call on an asset that has a stochastic volatility. This paper examines this problem. The option price is determined in series form for the case in which the stochastic volatility is independent of the stock price. Numerical solutions are also produced for the case in which the volatility is correlated with the stock price. It is found that the Black‐Scholes price frequently overprices options and that the degree of overpricing increases with the time to maturity.

The sphere of modern financial economics encompases finance, micro investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty. As is evident from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance, industrial organization and monetary theory, the boundaries of this sphere are both permeable and flexible. The complex interactions of time and uncertainty guarantee intellectual challenge and intrinsic excitement to the study of financial economics. Indeed, the mathematics of the subject contain some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. But for all its mathematical refinement, the research has nevertheless had a direct and significant influence on practice. It was not always thus. Thirty years ago, finance theory was little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data with an almost exclusive focus on corporate financial management. There is no need in this meeting of the guild to recount the subsequent evolution from this conceptual potpourri to a rigorous economic