Knowledge that Transforms

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines how incentive-based compensation contracts compare to flat-wage compensation contracts in motivating individual learning and performance. I use a multiperiod cognitive task where the accounting system generates information (feedback) that has both a contracting role and a belief-revision role. The results suggest that incentives enhance performance and the rate of improvement in performance by increasing both: (1) the amount of time participants devoted to the task, and (2) participants' analysis and use of information. Further, I find evidence that incentives improve performance only after considerable feedback and experience, which may help explain why many prior one-shot decision-making experiments show no incentive effects. Collectively, the results suggest that incentives induce individuals to work longer and smarter, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will develop and use the innovative strategies frequently required to perform well in complex judgment tasks and learning situations.

This paper investigates the interaction between financial structure, liquidation values and product market equilibrium. Liquidation values depend on how many firms are liquidated, and therefore on the industry equilibrium of capital structures and of technology choices. We show that firms using a technology with high liquidation value issue less debt than those with low liquidation value even if these ones may be inefficiently liquidated. With respect to the equilibrium in the industry, we obtain that even if in equilibrium all firms use the same technology, firms will use widely different capital structures.

The optimal bond-stock mix is examined in light of an apparent inconsistency between the Tobin Separation Theorem and the advice of popular investment advisors which has been pointed out by Canner et al. (1997).It is shown that the apparent inconsistency is largely explicable in terms of the hedging demands of optimising long-term investors in an environment in which the investment opportunity set is subject to stochastic shocks. The analysis points to the importance of considering investors' time horizons in analyzing optimal portfolio policies.

This paper investigates tax effects in the Canadian government bond market during the period 1964—1986. Unlike previous studies, we apply both statistical and nonstatistical teststo analyze clientele effects and market equilibria. The results divide the sample into two distinct periods of time, with the end of 1976 marking the division. We find that tax effects are almost nonexistent in the Canadian government bond market before the end of 1976, but are predominant in the post-1976 period. Non-segmented market equilibria cannot be rejected before 1977, but are strongly rejected after 1976. In fact, segmented equilibria with clientele effects in both quantities and prices characterize the entire five year period from 1982 to 1986. These findings are consistent with tax reforms, government deficit financing and interest rate fluctuations in Canada during our sample period.

This paper examines the valuation of European- and American-style volatility options based on a general equilibrium stochastic volatility framework. Properties of the optimal exercise region and of the option price are provided when volatility follows a general diffusion process. Explicit valuation formulas are derived in four particular cases. Emphasis is placed on the MRLP(mean-reverting in the log) volatility model which has received considerable empirical support. In this context we examine the properties and hedging behavior of volatility options. Unlike American options, European call options on volatility are found to display concavity at high levels of volatility.

This paper focuses on pricing and hedging options on a zero-coupon bond in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) framework when the value and/or functional form of forward interest rates volatility is unknown, but is assumed to lie between two fixed values. Due to the link existing between the drift and the diffusion coefficients of the forward rates in the Heath, Jarrow and Morton framework, this is equivalent to hedging and pricing the option when the underlying interest rate model is unknown. We show that a continuous range of option prices consistent with no arbitrage exist. This range is bounded by the smallest upper-hedging strategy and the largest lower-hedging strategy prices, which are characterized as the solutions of two non-linear partial differential equations. We also discuss several pricing and hedging illustrations.

This paper examines a number of valuation problems faced by an expected-utility maximizing investor who, over a given time horizon, is constrained to hold an asset which cannot be replicated by dynamic trading and which therefore does not have a unique no-arbitrage price. We first derive the private valuation which the investor assigns to the nontraded asset in order to determine his optimal investment in the traded assets. We thereby show that, as part of this portfolio, the investor hedges the private valuation process of the nontraded asset, rather than its market price process. We also study the price at which the investor would be willing to sell the nontraded asset if he were subsequently prohibited from trading in it, as well as the amount the investor would be willing to pay to remove the trading restriction. All three values are shown to depend in an intuitive manner on the investor’s risk aversion, the residual risk of the nontraded asset unhedged by the traded assets, the difference between the constrained holding and optimal unconstrained holding of the asset and the length of the time horizon over which the asset cannot be traded.

This paper presents a general intensity-based framework to value executive stock options (ESOs). It builds upon the recent advances in the credit risk modeling arena. The early exercise or forfeiture due to voluntary or involuntary employment termination and the early exercise due to the executive’s desire for liquidity or diversification are modeled as an exogenous point process with random intensity dependent on the stock price. Two analytically tractable specifications are given where the ESO value, expected time of exercise or forfeiture, and the expected stock price at the time of exercise or forfeiture are calculated in closed-form.

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different systems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and firm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This paper therefore investigates the more network- or bank-oriented German system. In panel regressions for 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996, we find ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively. However, this effect depends intricately on stock market exposure, the location of control rights, and the time horizon (short-run vs. long-run). We conclude from our results that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability,(2) ownership concentration seems to be sub-optimal for many German corporations, and, finally, (3) having financial institutions as largest shareholders of traded corporations improves corporate performance.

Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much-heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants using low-sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical changes and the fall in low-sulfur coal prices have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50% since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these changes is the main source of cost reductions, rather than trading per se. In the long run, allowance trading may achieve cost savings of 700-800 million per year compared to an "enlightened" command and control program characterized by a uniform emission rate standard. The cost savings would be twice as great if the alternative to trading were forced scrubbing. However, a comparison of potential cost savings in 1995 and 1996 with actual emissions costs suggests that most trading gains were unrealized in the first two years of the program.