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How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic

American Economic Review 2019 109(3), 844-875 open access
We study how individuals repay their debt using linked data on multiple credit cards. Repayments are not allocated to the higher interest rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing. Moreover, the degree of misallocation is invariant to the economic stakes, which is inconsistent with optimization frictions. Instead, we show that repayments are consistent with a balance-matching heuristic under which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. Balance matching captures more than half of the predictable variation in repayments and is highly persistent within individuals over time.

The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?

American Economic Review 2019 109(6), 2294-2332 open access
Media censorship is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. We conduct a field experiment in China to measure the effects of providing citizens with access to an uncensored internet. We track subjects’ media consumption, beliefs regarding the media, economic beliefs, political attitudes, and behaviors over 18 months. We find four main results: (i) free access alone does not induce subjects to acquire politically sensitive information; (ii) temporary encouragement leads to a persistent increase in acquisition, indicating that demand is not permanently low; (iii) acquisition brings broad, substantial, and persistent changes to knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended behaviors; and (iv) social transmission of information is statistically significant but small in magnitude. We calibrate a simple model to show that the combination of low demand for uncensored information and the moderate social transmission means China’s censorship apparatus may remain robust to a large number of citizens receiving access to an uncensored internet.

JPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years

Journal of Political Economy 2019 127(5), 2568-2568 open access
Previous article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection50%970%Reject with Reviews42%1239416%Revise9%18415138%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 457 daysView Table Image Previous article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 5October 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705908 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Recent Referees

Journal of Political Economy 2019 127(4) open access
Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Richard AkreshS. Nageeb AliFranklin AllenSiwan AndersonIsaiah AndrewsJose ApesteguiaAndrew AtkesonHeski Bar-IsaacPhilip BarrettBrian BeachJonathan BeauchampDaniel BenjaminRaquel BernalDan BernhardtV BhaskarAnna BindlerAndreas BlumeAlessandro BonattiOzan CandoganTimothy CasonDavid CesariniChristopher ChambersDamon ClarkAlain CohnJanet CurrieXianchi DaiErnesto Dal BoRafael Di TellaWill DobbieUlrich DoraszelskiMartin DufwenbergKeith EricsonSelman ErolJason FabermanJames FearonRaymond FismanChristopher FlinnAnthony FowlerXavier GabaixSebastian GalianiYana GallenPeter GanongRonald GoettlerRussell GolmanBenjamin GolubGautam GowrisankaranJeff GroggerGene GrossmanLars HansenTerrence HendershottHolger HerzRandi HjalmarssonMitchell HoffmanRichard HoldenRichard HornbeckPatrick HummelMitsuru IgamiLakshmi IyerPamela JakielaSeema JayachandranRobert JensenIan JewittLouis KaplowMichael KatzRalph KoijenFuhito KojimaAnton KolotilinSerhiy KozakAlbert KyleJoanna LaheyRasmus LandersoeFabian LangeAudrey LaporteBrad LarsenJohn LeahySangMok LeeLars LefgrenArik LevinsonShengwu LiAnnie LiangIlse LindenlaubMatthew LindquistBenjamin LockwoodLee LockwoodAlexander MackayJames MalcomsonMarco MariottiPaco MartorellGiovanni MastrobuoniR. McAfeeRyan McDevittXin MengRobert MoffittBenny MoldovanuFrancesca MolinariJack MountjoySharun MukandRichard MurphyDavid NeumarkPaul NiehausSam NorrisEmily OsterMichaela PagelAmanda PallaisLubos PastorAlessandro PavanJacopo PeregoRicardo Perez-TrugliaPetra PerssonRobert PollakJoseph PriceNancy QianNatalia RamondoChris RobinsonJames RobinsonGuillaume RocheteauAnne-Katrin RoeslerWilliam RogersonAdam RosenNilanjan RoyAldo RustichiniMartin SaavedraJohn SabelhausBernard SalanieTobias SalzAndres SantosAndrew SchotterEmanuela SciubbaEdson SeverniniDaniel SilvermanOskar SkansIsaac SorkinCharles SprengerYves SprumontBruno StruloviciMatthias SutterAlexander TabarrokMathieu Taschereau-DumouchelAlan TaylorMelissa ThomassonChristopher TimminsMirco ToninEric Van WincoopJoseph VavraEmanuel VespaSofia Villas-BoasReed WalkerTodd WalkerChristopher WallaceEbonya WashingtonDavid WettsteinDavid WheelockHeidi WilliamsEdward WolffThomas WollmannLeeat YarivNoam YuchtmanJohn Yiran ZhuOwen ZidarJames Ziliak Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 4August 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705558 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Recent Referees

Journal of Political Economy 2019 127(5) open access
Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Ran AbramitzkyEliot AbramsDaron AcemogluPhilipp AgerMohammad AkbarpourDouglas AlmondIsaiah AndrewsCharles AngelucciEduardo AzevedoScott BakerMiguel BallesterSamuel BazziJere BehrmanManudeep BhullerBruno BiaisDan BlackAlessandro BonattiMichael BordoEthan Bueno de MesquitaAriel BursteinLeonardo BursztynMarika CabralSteven CallanderJuan CarrilloKatherine CaseyAllan Collard-WexlerJonathan ColmerThomas CovertBenjamin CrostGordon DahlAndrew DaughetyGustavo De SouzaMelissa DellRebecca DiamondMichael DicksteinWill DobbieUlrich DoraszelskiChristian DustmannPiotr DworczakBenjamin EdelmanLasse EikaIgnacio EspondaJianqing FanHanming FangMax FarrellShuaizhang FengJesus Fernandez-VillaverdeJoseph FerrieFrederico FinanChristopher FlinnMarco FrancesconiPatrick FrancoisChao FuXavier GabaixPatrick GagliardiniCraig GalletOded GalorJorge Luis GarciaCamilo Garcia-JimenoMatthew GentzkowAlexander GorbenkoPiero GottardiJoshua GottliebFrancois GourioJeff GroggerRaymond GuiterasMarcus HagedornWilliam HanlonChiaki HaraTarjei HavnesKen HendricksRandi HjalmarssonRichard HoldenRichard HornbeckPeter HullSonia JaffePhilippe JehielGinger JinAmir JinaMatthew KahnRohan KekreRyan KelloggWilliam KerrBen KeysMartin KliemPatrick KlineScott KominersYunmi KongWojciech KopczukIgor KopylovBotond KoszegiTom KrebsKory KroftFelix KublerPeter KuhnKevin LangFabian LangeKurt LavettiJacob LeshnoMartin LettauEdwin LeuvenAndrei LevchenkoShengwu LiTong LiMing-Jen LinMaarten LindeboomJohn ListAlessandro LizzeriKatrine LokenGuido LorenzoniJune MaJim MacGeeNeale MahoneyMihai ManeaAlan ManningGustavo MansoRamon MarimonGiovanni MastrobuoniNiko MatouschekKathleen McGarryAlisdair McKayBrian McManusJonathan MeerLeonardo MelosiKyle MengMoritz Meyer-ter-VehnGuy MichaelsEdward MiguelKurt MitmanMassimo MorelliThayer MorrillMichael Mueller-SmithCaitlin MyersBarry NalebuffDerek NealPeter NormanMichael OstrovskyThomas PalfreyAmanda PallaisRohini PandeFernando ParroMichael PetersHerakles PolemarchakisBruce PrestonGautam RaoDaniel RappoportJohn RehbeckLudovic RenouHelene ReySteven RivkinJames RobertsJean-Laurent RosenthalMark RosenzweigHeather RoyerAysegul SahinBernard SalanieAnalia SchlosserMoritz SchularickKarl SchurterJoseph ShapiroBradley ShapiroHolger SiegArunima SinhaLones SmithAnthony Smith, Jr.Erik SnowbergPaulo SomainiJorge SpenkuchCharles SprengerLudwig StraubJohannes StroebelJan StuhlerTakuo SugayaPaolo SuricoJustin SydnorBalazs SzentesPietro TebaldiFelix TintelnotJean TirolePetra ToddAlexander TorgovitskyAaron TornellRagnar TorvikUtku UnverMartin UribeArthur van SoestAdrien VerdelhanPietro VeronesiJonathan VogelNico VoigtlaenderFabian WaldingerReed WalkerThomas WinberryAlexander WolitzkyLeeat YarivJunjian YiAli YurukogluBasit Zafar Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 5October 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/706773 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Managing systemic uncertainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids

Accounting, Organizations and Society 2019 77, 101049 open access
We study how multiple firms voluntarily design inter-firm mechanisms to manage industry-level systemic uncertainty. Facing a threat of systemic uncertainty that cannot be addressed by any one firm, we explain how the Australian cotton industry mobilised hybrids and boundary spanners to develop an industry-level solution at the inter-firm level. We apply resource dependence theory to extend Miller, Kurunmaki and O'Leary (2008), and identify a broader range of hybrid characteristics (novel, inter-firm, public/private and open source) than currently acknowledged in accounting studies. We use these characteristics to explain how hybrid organisational forms and hybrid control processes operate at the inter-firm level to develop and share a solution to systemic uncertainty, which are subsequently applied at the firm-level. Our findings also show how boundary spanners can operate with less tension in larger industry-level collaborations, explained using our resource dependence conceptualisation. This responds to Dekker's (2016) calls for more inter-firm research clarifying how controls operate beyond the firm.

Informational environments and the relative information content of analyst recommendations and insider trades

Accounting, Organizations and Society 2019 72, 61-73 open access
Analysts and insiders increase price informativeness by revealing new information to financial markets, and prior work has shown that these parties hold both firm-specific and aggregate information. This study examines how the level of informational efficiency with respect to a stock price's firm and industry-level information environment can differently mediate the information content of analyst recommendations and insider trades. I find that (1) the decrease in information revealed by insider trades is larger than that from analyst recommendations when a stock's price is more efficient with respect to firm-specific information, while (2) the increase in information revealed by analyst recommendations is larger than that from insider trades when a stock's price is less efficient with respect to industry-level information. Taken together, my results indicate that analysts (insiders) may have relative informational expertise with regards to industry (firm) information, and that both appear to rely on their specific expertise when informing prices.

Assembling performance measurement through engagement

Accounting, Organizations and Society 2019 78, 101052 open access
Taking inspiration from studies of performance measurement systems and an understanding of the materiality of inscription devices, we examine how a loose network of funding agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) assemble a performance and management system out of accountability requirements. As part of the funding process, international development agencies provide NGOs with a series of planning and project reporting requirements such as budgets, operational plans, and strategic plans. Our study focusses on how these requirements' visual features enable users to perform the calculative properties of the performance system, as a whole. Specifically, we learn how a planning and performance measurement device such as the logical framework accumulates financial, chronological, and strategic modes of ordering through a patchwork of interventions to address perceived and unexpected shortcomings. We find that it is not just a matter of adding patches to improve, but also about fostering engagement with the changing assemblage of devices and development concerns. Our study is based on field research in Guatemala and El Salvador and contributes to our understanding of how governing bodies intervene in the constitution of a calculative workspace. By analysing an accounting system's relation with other devices and their modes of ordering and calculating, we learn how a workspace for providing accounts is assembled and engaged with for actors to perform a mode of governing.

Multi-method evidence on investors’ reactions to managers’ self-inclusive language

Accounting, Organizations and Society 2019 79, 101071 open access
We investigate the joint effect of managers’ self-inclusive language (SIL) and performance news on investors’ reactions to accounting disclosures. We identify two types of SIL: individual SIL, which includes first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me) and collective SIL, which includes first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us). When performance news is negative, individual SIL implies that a manager is claiming sole responsibility for the unfavorable event whereas collective SIL and SEL diffuse responsibility. Therefore, we predict higher perceptions of manager credibility for individual SIL relative to collective SIL or self-exclusive language (SEL) when performance news is negative, which, in turn, increase investment judgments. We use a between-subjects experiment to test our predictions. Results show higher perceptions of manager credibility and higher investment judgments for individual SIL relative to collective SIL or SEL when performance news is negative. Results of a maximum likelihood estimation suggest that perceptions of manager credibility mediate the effect of individual SIL on investment judgments, supporting the notion that individual SIL exerts an indirect effect on investment judgments. We supplement experimental evidence with an analysis of managers’ SIL in a large sample of earnings conference calls. We document a positive (negative) market reaction to individual (collective) SIL when performance news is negative, consistent with our Hypothesis. We also find a positive market reaction to individual SIL when news is positive. Overall, our study offers multi-method evidence of the impact of a subtle and easily overlooked component of managers’ language on investors’ judgments.