Knowledge that Transforms

We study U.S. house price movements using a variance decomposition based on subjective expectations data from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers. We find that households’ subjective cash flow (income) expectations account for the dominant share of the overall variation in house prices, whereas subjective discount rate (return) expectations are insignificant. This finding is robust across different samples and subgroups based on home ownership, census regions, income, and age. This contrasts previous evidence from VAR-based models for rational expectations. Households’ ex post forecast errors and ex ante expectational errors are predictable from housing market information and credit conditions.

Prior studies indicate that rating agencies have adopted more stringent rating criteria over time. In this paper, we hypothesize that improvements in rating accuracy can explain some of these observed patterns. We present empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis, demonstrating that enhancements in rating methodologies have resulted in better default prediction. Our analysis also reveals that, over time, ratings have become more closely aligned with accounting fundamentals and a market-based measure of default risk (distance-to-default). These findings provide a fresh perspective on the factors influencing changes in credit rating standards and emphasize the significance of methodological advancements in credit risk assessment. This research introduces the novel argument that enhancing rating accuracy is an economic rationale for long-term rating trends. The findings underscore the continued importance of credit ratings despite criticisms, suggesting that ratings remain a valuable tool for investors.

We test for a link between bank risk-taking and regulatory enforcements against US banks for financial misconduct. Misconduct-related enforcements are associated with increased bank risk-taking on several measures of risk, and there is some evidence that the impact of enforcements on risk-taking is accentuated in the presence of powerful CEOs and a higher proportion of institutional investor ownership and mitigated when executive boards are larger, older, more independent, more gender diverse, busier, and where independent directors are relatively inexperienced. The results are robust to alternative measures of bank risk-taking, and alternative estimation techniques, including controlling for endogeneity bias.

How much does the liquidity of the secondary market matter for the pricing of the housing market? In this paper, we investigate a discontinuity in the supply of mortgages called the “conforming loan limit.” Mortgage loans smaller than this limit are eligible to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—and therefore, they are more easily underwritten and more readily supplied by lenders. Using county-level variation in this limit and a border discontinuity model with transaction-level data, we estimate that a 10% increase in this limit leads to a 3% to 4% increase in housing prices. We identify the transmission mechanism primarily at the intensive margins, as the higher conforming loan limit leads to larger individual loans and therefore a greater volume of total lending. We show evidence that this effect is likely driven by greater availability, rather than lower interest pricing, of conforming loans.

By flexibly weighting the information contained in past realized returns, we construct a momentum strategy that outperforms and subsumes the performance of traditional stock momentum. The strategy performs well in crises and continues to work in the most recent decades. We show that the way past returns are weighted is in line with the strategy exploiting an underreaction to the information contained in realized returns, but also investigate alternative behavioral and risk-based explanations. We find that the response to earnings announcements, market-wide jumps and large individual returns realized in the formation period are most informative about future stock returns.

I present evidence from CEO turnover decisions suggesting that boards update their beliefs about CEO ability more in industry crises than in booms. Consistent with predictions from an extended learning model that allows for increased productivity of CEO ability in crises, I find that the turnover-performance relation is weaker the more often the board has observed the CEO in past crises, and crisis performance reduces future dismissal risks more than boom performance. These effects persist after controlling for CEO entrenchment and firm effects, and they are stronger for more severe and recent crises. Employing a proxy of CEO ability, I also find that the dismissal risk of weak-ability CEOs is highest in crises. The results help refine our models of how boards learn about CEO ability and, in particular, help explain the turnover puzzle, i.e., why boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs in industry downturns: rather than misattributing poor industry conditions to CEOs, boards view performance in crises as a more informative signal of CEO ability than performance in booms.

We employ instrumented principal component analysis (IPCA) to provide a new factor model for the cross-section of country equity risk premia. Using data from 71 equity markets, we identify latent factors and condition betas on a comprehensive set of accounting and market characteristics from the finance literature. A four-factor conditional asset pricing model best captures the variation in country returns, beating prominent factor models. IPCA’s superior performance stems primarily from its enhanced ability to predict emerging market returns while also generalizing well to developed markets. Among the global “signal zoo”, size, momentum, volatility, political risk, and valuation are the most important predictors of return differences.

Media tone constructed from 7000,000 articles from 2000 global media and 800 social media sites is found to be a genuine risk factor that cross-sectionally prices currencies. It can predict excess US dollar returns for up to six months and surpasses the no-change benchmark in predicting returns out of sample. Its predicted value contains information beyond those predicted by currency factors and business cycles. Evidence corroborates with the theory that Media tone increases investment returns, has pronounced predictive power for the currencies associated with hard-to-value characteristics, and that its predictive power increases with the number of news sources. Trading of rational investors, including banks, is associated with Media tone.

We use recent European restrictions to evaluate how traders substitute across available dark pools. Our findings suggest that restricting dark trading at the most prominent platform has a detrimental effect on dark trading activity. Annual dark trading in a restricted stock decreases by more than 50 % over the six-month restriction period. Consistent with investors’ sticky relationships with specific dark pools, our results suggest that substitution across dark pools is remarkably low. Despite the availability of alternative dark pools, traders are unwilling to trade elsewhere. Our study provides evidence that dark trading is not a market of exchanges, but rather a collection of independent silos. This fact has implications for the vulnerability of dark trading to the introduction of an HFT into the pool, and sharpens our understanding of how the pecking order theory of trading actually functions.

This paper compares the economic impact of the collateral and bank lending channels in a unified framework by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to firms’ tangible assets and banks’ net worth caused by the massive Tohoku earthquake in 2011. We obtain the following findings: (1) both damage to a firm's tangible assets and to the net worth of its primary bank lead to an increase in the probability of the firm being credit constrained, which lends support to the existence of both the collateral and the bank lending channel; (2) the increase through the bank lending channel is about twice as large as and longer-lasting than that through the collateral channel; (3) the credit constraint has real effects: in terms of the aggregated sales decline, the impact through the bank lending channel is more than four times as large as that through the collateral channel, because the negative impact of damage to banks’ net worth spilled over to firms located outside the earthquake-damaged region. Overall, the bank lending channel played a far more substantial role than the collateral channel in the wake of the earthquake.