Knowledge that Transforms

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of “the public.” Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously. We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also, reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those ofthe member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public.

This paper argues that a risk-averse worker's after-tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information about her welfare. This insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance based on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment benefits. Some existing estimates imply significant gains to raising the current level of unemployment benefits in the United States but highlight the need for more research on the determinants of reservation wages. Our approach complements those based on Baily's [Journal of Public Economics, X (1978), 379–402] test.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

U. S. copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets. In response, these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination. I derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination, and I analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products. Using data on VHS and DVD movie distribution, I find that firms' pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms' use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers (but harms ancillary retailers). Finally, I examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination.

Why is GDP growth so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? We identify three possible reasons: (i) poor countries specialize in fewer and more volatile sectors; (ii) poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks (e.g., from macroeconomic policy); and (iii) poor countries' macroeconomic fluduations are more highly correlated with the shocks affecting the sectors they specialize in. We show how to decompose volatility into the various sources, quantify their contribution to aggregate volatility, and study how they relate to the stage of development. We document the following regularities. First, as countries develop, their productive structure moves from more volatile to less volatile sectors. Second, the volatility of country-specific macroeconomic shocks falls with development. Third, the covariance between sector-specific and country-specific shocks does not vary systematically with the level of development. There is also some evidence that the degree of sectoral concentration declines with development at early stages, and increases at later stages. We argue that many theories linking volatility and development are not consistent with these findings, and suggest new directions for future theoretical work.

We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents' social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and residential segregation. Using detailed data on friendship networks, we calculate levels of within-school racial segregation in a sample of U. S. schools. We also calculate residential segregation across major U. S. cities, using block-level data from the 2000 U. S. Census.

Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.

Between 1996 and 2003, the Peruvian government issued property titles to over 1.2 million urban households, the largest titling program targeted at urban squatters in the developing world. This paper examines the labor market effects of increases in tenure security resulting from the program. To isolate the causal role of ownership rights, I make use of differences across regions induced by the timing ofthe program and differences across target populations in level of preprogram ownership rights. My estimates suggest that titling results in a substantial increase in labor hours, a shift in labor supply away from work at home to work in the outside market, and substitution of adult for child labor.

Lower birth weight babies have worse outcomes, both short-run in terms of one-year mortality rates and longer run in terms of educational attainment and earnings. However, recent research has called into question whether birth weight itself is important or whether it simply reflects other hard-to-measure characteristics. By applying within twin techniques using an unusually rich dataset from Norway, we examine the effects of birth weight on both short-run and long-run outcomes for the same cohorts. We find that birth weight does matter; despite short-run twin fixed effects estimates that are much smaller than OLS estimates, the effects on longer-run outcomes such as adult height, IQ, earnings, and education are significant and similar in magnitude to OLS estimates.

Firms start and stop exporting. Previous research suggests that these export participation decisions alter the comovement of net exports with the real exchange rate. We evaluate these predictions in a general equilibrium environment. Specifically, assuming firms face an up-front, sunk cost of entering foreign markets, and a smaller period-by-period continuation cost, we derive the discrete entry and exit decisions yielding exporter dynamics in an open economy business cycle model. The model's business cycle exporter dynamics are consistent with that of U.S. exporters. However, in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analyses, model results reveal that export decisions have negligible aggregate effects.