Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines whether PCAOB inspection reports are useful for signaling the risk of misstatements in future periods and the extent to which different types of audit deficiencies predict future misstatements. We find that, after the inspection report is issued, PCAOB‐identified audit deficiencies are positively associated with future misstatements for the audit firm's entire client portfolio. When we examine different types of deficiencies, we find that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the most detrimental type of deficiency for future reporting quality. We also examine the deficiency types for Big 4 versus non–Big 4 firms separately. The results show that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the only deficiency type that is positively associated with future misstatements for Big 4 firms. For non–Big 4 firms, however, future misstatements are predicted by an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies, inadequate substantive testing, and inadequate going‐concern assessments. Our study has important implications given the concerns raised by auditors regarding the usefulness of PCAOB inspections.

Given the importance of research resource allocation within brokerage firms, we examine key factors that influence the issuance of individual versus team analyst reports. Using a comprehensive sample of analyst reports from China for the 2008–2021 period, we find that this decision is influenced by (1) the brokerage firm's client interests, whereby firms held by the brokerage firm's mutual fund clients and firms that are the brokerage firm's underwriting clients receive more team than individual reports from the brokerage firm, and (2) the nature of corporate events, whereby routine events receive more team reports and nonroutine events receive more individual reports. Additional analyses suggest that analysts' personal traits and analyst team characteristics also affect the decision. Our findings further the understanding of the factors that affect the organization and resource allocation of sell‐side equity research.

Management teams often avoid answering questions during conference call question and answer sessions (Q&As). Viewing this as an information asymmetry issue, accounting scholars have suggested that this behavior is ill‐advised and that non‐answers signal to investors the suppression of bad news. In this article, we demonstrate that this argument lacks nuance. Instead, we argue that answers and non‐answers necessarily coexist and are codependent. Our contribution stems from our social interactionist lens, whereby we draw on interdisciplinary perspectives of workplace silence to make sense of our data. We propose three explanations for managerial non‐answers, namely that they are used (1) defensively, (2) reflectively, and (3) negotiatively. Despite the seeming complexity, analysts claim they can make sense of what managers are able to say in this forum, and by extension, what they do (or perhaps, can) not. From here, we argue that analysts are socialized to managerial non‐answers. Despite this, there is general concern that investors allow an innate fear of “silence” to prejudice their judgment of non‐answers. Thus, we highlight a communication gap between management, intermediary, and investor. On the one hand, this implies a source of market inefficiency, but on the other it points toward a source of potential value in sell‐side analyst work, specifically, their experience and expertise in social interaction.

Leadership is considered a core competency for auditors. This study examines how auditors' leadership ability affects their labor market outcomes and audit firm performance. Using Swedish military data on qualified auditors (CPAs), we first show that auditors' leadership ability, measured at around age 18, is a strong predictor of their income and career success. However, our results also suggest that the audit labor market compensates for auditors' leadership ability at a much later stage than the general labor market. Second, we examine whether the value of leadership ability derives from higher‐quality auditing, commercial performance, or both. We find strong evidence that leadership ability enhances auditors' commercial performance and some evidence on leadership ability being associated with higher audit quality. Third, at the audit firm level, we find that auditors' leadership ability significantly benefits audit firm performance measured as client portfolio size and audit firm profitability. Finally, we investigate leadership talent attraction and retention in the auditing profession. We find that the auditing profession attracts better leadership talent than the general labor market. Although nearly a quarter of CPAs leave the profession over the sample period, there is no significant difference in leadership ability between those who stay and those who leave. Overall, our results have important practical implications for audit firms' talent management.

Although it has always been important for firms that employees innovate predefined processes, the working environment in which employees implement these processes has significantly changed. Currently, the working environment is often characterized by employee surveillance; that is, the way in which employees conduct a process is monitored. In the current study, we present the results of an experiment examining the effect of process monitoring on process improvements by employees. Although previous accounting literature has reported negative effects of monitoring techniques on several organizational outcomes, we show that process monitoring can have a positive effect on employees' implementation of process improvements in the absence, but not in the presence, of a firm's error avoidance policy. Without an error avoidance policy, employees are motivated to create a favorable impression in front of management by implementing process improvements. This finding has important implications for business practice. From a broader perspective, we show that the influence of action controls depends on the parameters of a cultural control.

We analyze whether and how the perceived federal‐level legal liability linked to federal judge ideology is associated with the likelihood of firms receiving going‐concern modified audit opinions and analyze the differential effects on Big 4 and non–Big 4 auditors. We find that Big 4 and non–Big 4 auditors converge in their going‐concern reporting decisions in circuits with more liberal judges. This convergence is caused by the greater effect of judge ideology on non–Big 4 auditors. Furthermore, we empirically examine the association between federal judge ideology and actual lawsuits against auditors and find that judge ideology has a greater impact on lawsuit likelihood for non–Big 4 auditors for the restating companies. When auditors are sued, both the payout likelihood and amount are greater in circuits with more liberal judges, with the effect being more pronounced for non–Big 4 auditors. This study provides evidence on how the perceived exposure to a gross negligence legal standard shapes auditors' going‐concern reporting incentives for the two tiers of auditors in the market. It also adds to the literature on auditor litigation.

Granting decision rights to minority shareholders protects them from expropriation by controlling shareholders, but it simultaneously fosters a mismatch between decision rights and decision‐relevant information. Using the setting of China's classified voting system (CVS), which requires minority shareholder approval for managerial proposals, this study investigates the effect of such a regulation on investment responsiveness to profitability and equity value attributable to growth options. Following the real‐options‐based valuation model, we document that the adoption of CVS diminishes both investment responsiveness and equity value. This reduction is attributed to heightened financial constraints following the CVS implementation. Further analyses show the negative impacts are more pronounced for firms experiencing greater information asymmetry, lower mutual fund holdings, and severe agency conflicts. Our evidence indicates that the efficacy of the regulation is contingent on the alignment between decision rights of minority shareholders and decision‐relevant information available to them. Our findings thus provide insights to the regulators regarding the advantages and disadvantages of allowing minority shareholders direct influence over corporate decision‐making.

We examine how progressive individual tax rates affect risk‐taking by pass‐through businesses (PTBs). PTBs generate over 60% of US business income and make up roughly 95% of business tax returns, yet there is limited research on how progressive tax rates affect project selection. We study PTBs using the setting of thoroughbred racing and examine how progressive tax rates affect the decision to enter a risky stakes race or a less risky allowance race. This setting provides a unique opportunity to observe the choice between two mutually exclusive projects that differ only in expected payoffs and risk. Using a difference‐in‐differences design surrounding the reduction in progressivity under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we find that investment in stakes races increases in the United States relative to Canada. We find further evidence of a negative relation between progressive tax rates and risk‐taking using a plausibly exogenous shock in progressivity in California and exploiting cross‐sectional variation in the progressivity of state tax rates. Overall, our findings should be of interest to policy‐makers considering changes to progressive rates. Results indicate that increases to progressive tax rates may discourage risk‐taking by the small businesses that drive economic growth.

We examine the effect of product market competitors' listing delays on incumbent firms' defensive strategies, including efforts in customer retention and acquisition as well as merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. To establish causality, we use four regulation‐induced IPO suspensions in China that expose firms already approved for an IPO to indeterminate listing delays. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that incumbent firms reduce efforts in customer retention and acquisition, as manifested in an increase in accounts receivable turnover and a decrease in selling expenses. Incumbent firms also reduce M&A activities, including high‐premium and horizontal ones. The effects are stronger for incumbent firms that are subject to more intensive competition from the suspended firm, face larger competitive pressure from existing public firms, and are more financially constrained. Additionally, incumbent firms' managers reduce competition‐related disclosures, and the firms' financial performance improves after competitors' listing delays. Consistent with the findings based on listing delays, we find that incumbent firms increase efforts in customer retention and acquisition and M&As surrounding competitors' IPO application and approval. Our paper sheds new light on the IPO peer effect, especially on how incumbent firms respond to the product market competitor's capital market entry.

Securities litigation risk is a well‐recognized yet underexplored source of financial reporting complexity or unreadability. This study examines the effect of litigation risk on the readability of corporate financial reports. The 1999 Silicon Graphics Inc. (SGI) court ruling unexpectedly reduced litigation risk for firms within the Ninth Circuit Court's jurisdiction. Using a difference‐in‐differences design centered on the SGI court ruling, we find that, while the readability of financial reports generally declines over the sample period, treated firms in the Ninth Circuit experience a comparatively smaller decline in readability than control firms in other states after the ruling. Put differently, treated firms experience a relative improvement in reporting readability following the ruling. This effect is concentrated among firms prone to securities litigation and those with greater external financing needs, but it is muted for firms engaging in earnings management. Furthermore, improved reporting readability among treated firms can be partially attributed to alleviated concerns about the adequacy of cautionary language, as evidenced by a significant decrease in negative forward‐looking statements, particularly risk‐related ones. Collectively, our findings suggest that securities litigation risk contributes to reduced readability in financial reporting.