This paper is an empirical exploration of the determinants of the required credit spreads on highly leveraged transaction (HLT) loans. The analysis uses a multi-factor spread model to estimate the movement of loan spreads relative to spreads required in the (competing) corporate bond market as well as the significance of loan-specific characteristics in determining loan spreads. The empirical estimates are based on the Loan Pricing Corporation's database which consists of over 4000 loan transactions between 1987 and 1994. We find a positive HLT loan spread sensitivity to changes in spreads in the corporate bond market, but this sensitivity is significantly less than unity; indicating that the HLT loan market and high yield public debt market are not fully integrated. Furthermore, there is evidence that lenders augment, rather than substitute, loan yield spreads with additional fees for syndication, commitment and cancellation risks. In general syndicated loans have lower yield spreads than other HLT loan types.

Using a market segmentation argument, this paper uses the interest rate derivative's arbitrage-free methodology to value both demand deposit liabilities and credit card loan balances in markets where deposits/loan rates may be determined under imperfect competition. In this context, these financial instruments are shown to be equivalent to a particular interest rate swap, where the principal depends on the past history of market rates. Solutions are obtained which are independent of any particular model for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates.

We present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline. Moody's downgrades, indicators of increasing risk, are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank's reliance on insured deposits. Moreover, banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk. These findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment. More generally, our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries.

ABSTRACT Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

We estimate how much of the wealth of a sample of respondents to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics is held because some households face more income uncertainty than others. We begin by solving a theoretical model of saving, which we use to develop appropriate measures of uncertainty. We then regress households' wealth on our measures of uncertainty, and find substantial evidence that households engage in precautionary saving. Finally, we simulate the wealth distribution that our empirical results imply would prevail if all households had the same uncertainty as the lowest uncertainty group. We find that between 32 and 50% of wealth in our sample is attributable to the extra uncertainty that some consumers face compared to the lowest uncertainty group.

ABSTRACT We use panel data on prices and net asset values to test whether dramatic country‐specific news affects the response of closed‐end country fund prices to asset value. In a typical week, prices underreact to changes in fundamentals; the (short‐run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with news appearing on the front page of The New York Times , prices react much more; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that news events lead some investors to react more quickly.

This paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private‐market corporate lending, adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature. Comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies, we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information‐problematic firms. However, finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers, particularly more leveraged borrowers. Evidence supports both regulatory and reputation‐based explanations for this specialization. In passing, we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies.