Historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals' normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets. To explore these issues, we construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange. In our model buyers must carry cash while shopping, and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good. Since buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger (hence richer) customers, their bargaining position is weakened by inflation, allowing sellers to extract a higher real price. However, we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers' search, increasing sellers' wait for customers. As a result, the volume of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls. At high enough rates of inflation, all agents suffer a welfare loss.

We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all blocking trades are chosen with positive probability, convergence to a stable allocation occurs in finite time with probability 1. If coalitions are unrestricted, the outcome of vote trading must be Pareto optimal, but unless there are three voters or two issues, it need not correspond to the Condorcet winner.