This paper examines how the cost of bank debt reflects public information about borrower quality, and whether such information complements or substitutes the private information of banks. Using a sample of small business loans, and the award of a competitive public subsidy as an observable positive signal of external certification, we find that certification is associated with a lower cost of debt for subsidy recipients if the amount of private information of the lender is limited or the local credit market is less competitive. Public information loses importance once the bank accumulates information over the course of the lending relationship or the credit market is more competitive. Our results highlight a positive effect of external certification, driven by the signal it provides to both the lending bank and its competitors, and suggest that public and private information can be substitutes in the pricing of bank debt.

We examine possible reallocation effects generated by the COVID-19 outbreak by analyzing the patterns of venture capital (VC) investments around the globe. Using transaction-level data and exploiting the staggered nature of the spread of the virus, we document a shift in VC portfolios towards firms developing technologies relevant to an environment of social distancing and health pandemic concerns. A difference-in-differences analysis estimates significant increases in invested amount and number of deals in such areas. We show heterogenous effects related to the experience of VC investors, as well as their size and organizational form.

This paper examines how collateralization in small business lending varies with bank-borrower proximity. Our analysis establishes a robust inverse relationship between distance and collateral: Borrowers located in the vicinity of the bank face higher collateral requirements. The estimated relationship is independent of the allocation of decision-making authority within the lending organization, competitive pressure in the local credit markets, or risk rating of the borrower. Our findings seem consistent with the notion that distance reflects transaction costs associated with the assessment, inspection, and possible repossession of collateral.