Stakeholders in the Chapter 11 reorganization process face significant information uncertainty about the post‐emergence prospects of the firm. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to provide a disclosure statement containing “adequate information” about its financial status and a proposed reorganization plan but stops short of rigidly defining the adequacy standard. We document the heterogeneity in disclosure statement information across 16 distinct attributes and examine the variation in disclosures along several dimensions that reflect agency costs and coordination problems. We observe that Chapter 11 disclosure correlates more with claimant‐ and case‐specific characteristics than pre‐bankruptcy debtor characteristics. Our results illustrate the importance of institutional features in specific disclosure settings such as bankruptcy court filings. The research questions and methods of this study were registered via the Journal of Accounting Research ’s registration‐based editorial process.

We show that the vast majority of investors ignore value-relevant accruals information when it is first released, but that investors who initiate trades of at least 5,000 shares tend to transact in the proper direction. These investors trade on accruals information only when the previously-announced earnings signal is non-negative. Unconditionally, those investors initiating the smallest trades appear to respond to accruals in the wrong direction, but further investigation suggests this behavior is explained by their attraction to attention-grabbing stocks. Finally, we find that those who trade on accruals information have insufficient market power to mitigate the accruals anomaly.