This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in timing their trades and engaging in stealth trading, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and stealth trading was common. Event study abnormal returns are larger after reports of stealth trades than after reports of otherwise similar non-stealth trades. Our results imply that delayed reporting impedes the adjustment of prices to the information revealed by insider trades. They lend strong support to the more stringent reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.

We document a long-lasting association between a common societal phenomenon, early-life family disruption, and investment behavior. Controlling for socioeconomic status and family background, we find fund managers who experienced the death or divorce of their parents during childhood exhibit a stronger disposition effect, take lower risk, and are more likely to sell their holdings following risk-increasing firm events. The results are consistent with persistent symptoms of post-traumatic stress and strengthen as treatment intensifies. The evidence adds to our understanding of the role of social factors and “nurture” in finance as well as the origin of investment biases.