During a look-back analysis, auditors review prior-period evidence to understand estimation inaccuracies and assess the reliability of management's estimation process. We find that evidence specificity moderates the relation between the consistency of an estimation inaccuracy with management's incentives and auditors' reliability assessments. The direction of an estimation inaccuracy has no effect on auditors' reliability assessments when the prior-period evidence is less specific. When prior-period evidence is more specific, auditors report the highest (lowest) reliability assessments of management's estimation process when an estimation inaccuracy is inconsistent (consistent) with management's incentives. Auditors' low reliability assessments in the more specific, consistent condition, however, do not translate to high risk assessments. Instead, specificity has a main effect on auditors' risk assessments. A follow-up experiment reveals, though, an inverse relation between auditors' reliability and risk assessments when auditors are provided procedures to address various levels of assessed misstatement risk.

Given the uncertainty regarding auditors' responsibilities, standard setters considered the need for clarification of technical terms such as reasonable assurance in the new audit reporting models. The PCAOB ultimately decided to exclude clarifying language from its final standard, while the Auditing Standards Board and IAASB made such language mandatory. Given the difference in reporting models, this study investigates the role clarification of reasonable assurance plays in auditor negligence. We predict and find that, absent clarification, jurors judge auditors to be more negligent when the audit report includes a related critical audit matters disclosure than when it does not. However, consistent with our prediction, clarifying what is meant by reasonable assurance mitigates this increase in auditors' liability exposure by reducing jurors' perceptions of auditors' personal control over the misstatement at the time of the audit. Thus, our evidence suggests that the PCAOB's decision to not include such language in the new audit reporting model may have been shortsighted given the potential for clarification to mitigate a potential negative unintended consequence to auditors' litigation exposure under the new audit reporting model.

In this study, we leverage judgment decomposition and information acquisition theories to develop and test an intervention to improve group auditors' identification of and response to component‐level qualitative risk. Improving group auditors' response to qualitative risk is important because (1) group audits are prevalent today and require multiple qualitative risk assessments, (2) auditors have historically overlooked qualitative risks, and (3) prior interventions have failed to improve auditors' response to qualitative risk. In an experiment with 88 audit partners and managers, we find that a hybrid risk assessment approach that combines elements of judgment decomposition and notetaking improves auditors' group audit planning decisions. Specifically, auditors utilizing our hybrid approach are better able to identify and respond to component‐level qualitative risks than auditors who use a holistic approach. Importantly, the improvement in qualitative risk response does not come at the expense of auditors' response to quantitative risk.