The 2020 COVID-19 crisis can spur research on firms' corporate finance decisions and their macroeconomic implications, similar to the wave of important research on banking and household finance triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. What are the relevant corporate finance mechanisms in this crisis? Modeling dynamics and timing considerations are likely important, as is integrating corporate financing considerations into modern quantifiable macroeconomics models. Recent empirical work, including articles in this special issue, on the drag from debt in the COVID-19 crisis provides a first glimpse into the new research agenda.

ABSTRACT We analyze the behavior of credit and output in financial crises using data on credit spreads and credit growth. Crises are marked by a sharp rise in credit spreads, signaling sudden shifts in expectations. The severity of a crisis can be predicted by the extent of credit losses (spread increases) and financial sector fragility (precrisis credit growth). This interaction is a key feature of crises. Postcrisis recessions are typically severe and prolonged. Notably, precrisis spreads tend to drop to low levels while credit growth accelerates, indicating that credit supply expansions often precede crises. The 2008 crisis aligns with these patterns.

Investors value the liquidity and safety of US Treasuries. We document this by showing that changes in Treasury supply have large effects on a variety of yield spreads. As a result, Treasury yields are reduced by 73 basis points, on average, from 1926 to 2008. Both the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries are driving this phenomenon. We document this by analyzing the spread between assets with different liquidity (but similar safety) and those with different safety (but similar liquidity). The low yield on Treasuries due to their extreme safety and liquidity suggests that Treasuries in important respects are similar to money.

Abstract We evaluate the effects of three European Central Bank (ECB) policies (the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)) on government bond yields. We use a novel Kalman-filter augmented event-study approach and yields on euro-denominated sovereign bonds, dollar-denominated sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, and corporate credit default swap (CDS) rates to understand the channels through which policies reduced sovereign bond yields. On average across Italy, Spain and Portugal, considering both the SMP and the OMT, yields fall considerably. Decomposing this fall, default risk accounts for 37% of the reduction in yields, reduced redenomination risk for 13%, and reduced market segmentation effects for 50%. Stock price increases in distressed and core countries suggest that these policies also had beneficial macro-spillovers.

ABSTRACT “Limits of Arbitrage” theories hypothesize that the marginal investor in a particular asset market is a specialized arbitrageur rather than a diversified representative investor. We examine the mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) market in this light. We show that the risk of homeowner prepayment, which is a wash in the aggregate, is priced in the MBS market. The covariance of prepayment risk with aggregate wealth implies the wrong sign to match the observed prices of prepayment risk. The price of risk is better explained by a kernel based on MBS market‐wide specific risk, consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis.

ABSTRACT Severe flight to quality episodes involve uncertainty about the environment, not only risk about asset payoffs. The uncertainty is triggered by unusual events and untested financial innovations that lead agents to question their worldview. We present a model of crises and central bank policy that incorporates Knightian uncertainty. The model explains crisis regularities such as market‐wide capital immobility, agents' disengagement from risk, and liquidity hoarding. We identify a social cost of these behaviors, and a benefit of a lender of last resort facility. The benefit is particularly high because public and private insurance are complements during uncertainty‐driven crises.

ABSTRACT We develop a theory that links the U.S. dollar's valuation in FX markets to the convenience yield that foreign investors derive from holding U.S. safe assets. We show that this convenience yield can be inferred from the Treasury basis, the yield gap between U.S. government and currency‐hedged foreign government bonds. Consistent with the theory, a widening of the basis coincides with an immediate appreciation and a subsequent depreciation of the dollar. Our results lend empirical support to models that impute a special role to the United States as the world's provider of safe assets and the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

ABSTRACT This paper constructs a liquidity mismatch index (LMI) to gauge the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities, for 2,882 bank holding companies over 2002 to 2014. The aggregate LMI decreases from +$4 trillion precrisis to −$6 trillion in 2008. We conduct an LMI stress test revealing the fragility of the banking system in early 2007. Moreover, LMI predicts a bank's stock market crash probability and borrowing decisions from the government during the financial crisis. The LMI is therefore informative about both individual bank liquidity and the liquidity risk of the entire banking system.

What makes an asset a “safe” asset? We study a model where two countries each issue sovereign bonds to satisfy investors’ safe asset demands. The countries differ in the float of their bonds and the fundamental resources available to rollover debts. A sovereign’s debt is safer if its fundamentals are strong relative to other possible safe assets, not merely strong on an absolute basis. If demand for safe assets is high, a large float enhances safety through a market depth benefit. If demand for safe assets is low, then large debt size is a negative as rollover risk looms large. (JEL F34, H63)

The field of asset pricing is a rich and diverse discipline that has contributed to many areas of discourse, including those of fundamental importance to policy makers, investors, and households.1 As we look ahead during a time of substantial economic and political change, it is apparent that society faces many pressing questions, both new and old, that the field is uniquely suited to informing.To contribute to this conversation, the NBER Asset Pricing program convened a panel discussion on “Perspectives on the Future of Asset Pricing” at its November 8, 2019, meeting that took place at Stanford University. The objective of the panel was to identify some of the important questions the field could productively address in the next five to 10 years. The panelists, consisting of experts in several subfields of asset pricing, were invited to share their views on these questions with an eye toward innovative research topics that are ripe for exploring, and the metrics the field could be using to gauge progress.