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Rights Offerings, Subscription Period, Shareholder Takeup, and Liquidity

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2012 47(1), 213-239 open access
Abstract We examine the role of shareholder takeup in rights offerings on the subscription period price reaction and liquidity. Our results indicate that takeup information is reflected in price adjustments over the subscription period and that quality-related information disclosed on the rights announcement date further impacts prices in this period. Higher shareholder takeup improves liquidity. We do find some evidence of inefficiencies in the adjustment process over the subscription period that, in part, is consistent with a model where markets are characterized by overconfident investors and that also articulates with takeup information arriving in the market.

Insider ownership and dividend policy in an imputation tax environment

Journal of Corporate Finance 2019 54, 153-167 open access
Firms are more likely to pay dividends with higher payout ratios in an imputation environment. The effects of profitability and earned/contributed capital mix on the decision to pay dividends and dividend payout are weaker for firms following imputation tax system than traditional tax system. Insider ownership is positively related to the decision to pay dividends and dividend payout and this effect does not vary between traditional and imputation tax systems. Firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are less likely to pay dividends and have lower payout ratios. The study demonstrates the significance of the imputation tax system upon dividend policy.

Pension Deficits and the Design of Private Debt Contracts

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2019 54(4), 1821-1854 open access
We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.