This study investigates whether the net deferred tax liabilities disclosed under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (SFAS No. 109) provides additional value-relevant information over the disclosure required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes (APS No. 11). Evidence suggests that SEAS No. 109 data represent value-relevant information above and beyond APB No. 11. Additionally, evidence indicates that the changes made by SFAS No. 109-the separate recognition of deferred tax assets, the creation of valuation allowances for deferred tax assets and the adjustment of deferred tax accounts for enacted tax rate changes-each provide value-relevant firm data. These results suggest that SFAS No. 109 increased the value-relevance of deferred tax amounts in financial statements.

We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.

The lock-in effect proposes that capital gains taxes represent transaction costs that increase the reservation price for security owners and, ceteris paribus, reduce trading volume. Consistent with the lock-in effect, previous empirical research documents price and reactions to enacted changes in the capital gains tax rate. We investigate whether the volume hypothesis predicted by the lock-in effect extends to corporate acquisition activity. In particular, we analyze whether aggregate corporate acquisition activity is inversely associated with shareholder capital gains tax rates. We measure quarterly corporate acquisition activity from 1973 through 2001 using (1) the percentage of traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter and (2) the percentage of market value of traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter. In supplemental analysis, we measure acquisition activity at the industry level (i.e., as the percentage of firms and percentage of market value acquired by industry annually). In each analysis we model acquisition activity as a function of the maximum long-term capital gains tax rate for individuals and other macroeconomic factors previously hypothesized to be associated with acquisition activity. Consistent with a lock-in effect for corporate acquisitions, we find a significant negative association between corporate acquisition activity and the capital gains tax rate whether we measure acquisition activity in the aggregate or at the industry level. In addition, we find that this negative association is attributable to increased (decreased) taxable acquisition activity during periods of low (high) capital gains tax rates. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, capital gains taxes represent significant transaction costs that influence the level of corporate acquisition activity.

We exploit cross‐temporal differences in capital gains tax rates to test whether shareholder‐level capital gains taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. We model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price‐setting shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Consistent with a lock‐in effect for acquisition premiums, results suggest a unique positive association between shareholder capital gains taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions, which is mitigated by target institutional ownership.

Extant research suggests that book-tax differences are useful measures in evaluating firm performance. There is little evidence, however, regarding taxable income as an alternative performance measure to book income. We examine firm characteristics that mitigate or enhance the ability of taxable income to inform investors regarding firm performance. We find that the relative and incremental information content of estimated taxable income to book income is lower for high tax planning firms and higher for low earnings quality firms. Our results suggest that tax planning and low earnings quality have contrasting effects on the information content of estimated taxable income. These findings are pertinent to recent research examining book-tax differences as a measure of earnings quality and taxable income as an alternative performance measure.

We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as “pseudo” targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be more pronounced). We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. In sum, we are unable to eliminate other plausible explanations for the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.