What stands out in retrospect about U.S. monetary policy during the Greenspan Era is the ongoing movement away from mechanistic restrictions on the conduct of policy, together with a willingness on occasion to depart even from what more flexible guidelines dictated by contemporary conventional wisdom would imply, in the interest of carrying out the Federal Reserve System's dual mandate to pursue both stable prices and maximum employment. Part of this change was procedural -for example, the elimination of money growth targets. The most substantive demonstration of policy flexibility came in the latter half of the 1990s, as unemployment fell below 6% (in 1994), then below 5% (in 1997), and then remained below 5% for more than four years, yet the Federal Reserve did not tighten monetary policy. This policy stance was consistent with a view of the economy, including faster productivity growth and increased exposure to international competition, that Chairman Greenspan had articulated nearly a decade before.

Individuals in the United States consistently do most of their saving through financial intermediaries, but over time there have been and continue to be major shifts in people's reliance on specific kinds of intermediary institutions. In recent years, for example, individual savers have relied progressively more on pensions and thrift institutions and progressively less on life insurance companies. Moreover, legislative and regulatory actions currently under discussion would further alter the pattern of individuals' saving flows. This paper assesses the potential effects on interest rates, and via interest rates (and asset prices and yields more generally) on nonfinancial economic activity, of four specific shifts in saving behavior: additional pension contributions financed by individuals, additional pension contributions financed by businesses, additional purchases of life insurance by individuals, and additional deposits in thrift institutions by individuals. The paper's results indicate that such shifts, in plausible magnitudes, would have significant effects not only on interest rates and asset-liability flows but also on both the level and the composition of nonfinancial economic activity. In particular, although the specific effects differ from one shift to another, each would disproportionately stimulate capital formation in comparison to other forms of spending.

Benjamin M. Friedman, V. Vance Roley, Investors' Portfolio Behavior under Alternative Models of Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations: Unitary, Rational, or Autoregressive, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 6 (Nov., 1979), pp. 1475-1497

Short‐term interest rates in the United States have been “too high” since October 1979 in the sense that both unconditional and conditional forecasts, based on an estimated vector autoregression model summarizing the prior experience, underpredict short‐term interest rates during this period. Although a nonstructural model cannot directly answer the question of why this has been so, comparisons of alternative conditional forecasts point to the post‐October 1979 relationship between the growth of real income and the growth of real money balances as closely connected to the level and pattern of short‐term interest rates. This finding is consistent with the authors' earlier conclusion, based on analysis of a small structural macroeconometric model, that the high average level of interest rates has been due to a combination of slow growth of (nominal) money supply and continuing price inflation, which together have kept real balances small in relation to prevailing levels of economic activity.