Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding and super voting rights are common. Using these devices, a family can control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries'' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested n creating agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group. The result is a poor utilization of resources. At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation. The result is an economy-wide misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth.

Stock prices move together more in poor economies than in rich economies. This finding is not due to market size and is only partially explained by higher fundamentals correlation in low-income economies. However, measures of property rights do explain this difference. The systematic component of returns variation is large in emerging markets, and appears unrelated to fundamentals co-movement, consistent with noise trader risk. Among developed economy stock markets, higher firm-specific returns variation is associated with stronger public investor property rights. We propose that strong property rights promote informed arbitrage, which capitalizes detailed firm-specific information.

Disequilibrating macro shocks affect different firms’ prospects differently, increasing idiosyncratic variation in forward-looking stock returns before affecting economic growth. Consistent with most such shocks from 1947 to 2020 enhancing productivity, increased idiosyncratic stock return variation forecasts next-quarter real GDP growth, industrial production growth, and consumption growth both in-sample and out-of-sample. These effects persist after controlling for other leading economic indicators.

China’s monetary stimulation after the global financial crisis rapidly boosted its GDP. We argue that its efficacy derives from state control over its banking and corporate sectors. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest and they invested. Our data show much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate and land prices rises occurred where these SOEs were active buyers. This episode mimics the credit channel for monetary policy, but actually entails internal transfers between arms of the government pressuring on real estate prices upwards.