This paper studies the long-term effects of technology and know-how transfers on structural transformations. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union supported the construction of the 156 Projects, which were large-scale, capital-intensive industrial clusters in China. These projects included a technology transfer, consisting of state-of-the-art Soviet machinery and equipment, and a know-how transfer, via the training of Chinese engineers, production supervisors, and high-skilled technicians by Soviet experts. We use newly assembled data that follow steel plants for over four decades, and we exploit natural variation in the transfers they eventually received. We find that, while production advantages stemming from Soviet technology faded away if not complemented with training, the know-how transfer had a long-lasting impact on plant performance, stimulated technology upgrade when China was a closed economy, and increased exports to the Western world when China engaged in international trade. The know-how transfer also generated productivity and technology spillovers onto complementary establishments.

We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decision-making is the leading reason why government investors are unattractive to private firms. Overall, our findings point to the limits of a model of “state capitalism” that strongly relies on the complementarity between private firms and government capital to drive high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation.