Abstract We survey public company executives and directors to understand what audit clients want from their auditor in today’s regulated environment. Our results provide at least three important takeaways. First, executives and directors view elements of auditors’ service quality (e.g., timeliness of communications) as at least as important as auditors’ technical competence. Second, we find no evidence that stakeholders’ preferences for service quality replaces their expectation for technical competence. Third, we find that 57% of executives and 67% of directors feel they can very accurately assess audit quality after an audit’s completion, but we are unable to identify clear determinants of participants’ self-reported ability to assess quality. Our results highlight the challenges facing auditors as they attempt to please clients, protect shareholders, and comply with regulations, all while offering a product whose quality is inherently challenging for others to assess. Our findings motivate future research and inform regulatory efforts.

Abstract In this study, we leverage judgment decomposition and information acquisition theories to develop and test an intervention to improve group auditors' identification of and response to component‐level qualitative risk. Improving group auditors' response to qualitative risk is important because (1) group audits are prevalent today and require multiple qualitative risk assessments, (2) auditors have historically overlooked qualitative risks, and (3) prior interventions have failed to improve auditors' response to qualitative risk. In an experiment with 88 audit partners and managers, we find that a hybrid risk assessment approach that combines elements of judgment decomposition and notetaking improves auditors' group audit planning decisions. Specifically, auditors utilizing our hybrid approach are better able to identify and respond to component‐level qualitative risks than auditors who use a holistic approach. Importantly, the improvement in qualitative risk response does not come at the expense of auditors' response to quantitative risk.

ABSTRACT We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors’ response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office has previously audited other similarly accused clients. Importantly, the resulting increase in auditors’ effort partially negates the association between indiscretions and lower financial reporting quality. However, auditors are primarily reactive, rather than proactive, and their response is stronger when the accused client is less important economically. These results suggest that company leadership’s off-the-clock indiscretions are signals to auditors of poor tone at the top, but the audit response is not uniform across all clients. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48; G34.