This paper presents a series of simple but realistic examples in which common algebraic indexing conventions are not so convenient. In particular, it analyzes the difficulties caused by the conventions that each model component must have a fixed number of indices and that the order of the indices is significant to their meaning. To deal with these difficulties compensating extensions to algebraic notation are proposed. The proposed notation is compared to existing notation in terms of the human abilities to understand, maintain and verify model descriptions.

This paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading, using a unique data set that reports the transactions (large and small) of 37 large institutional money management firms. The direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known. Although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure, we find that the average effect is small. There is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells. We relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks, the cost of executing transactions, and the determinants of market impact. Although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade, the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade.

ABSTRACT Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.

This paper tests for the existence of expectational effects in very disaggregate price equations. Price equations are estimated using monthly data for each of 40 products. The dynamic specification of the equations is also tested, including whether the equations should be specified in level

This paper develops a general framework for analyzing corporate risk management policies. We begin by observing that if external sources of finance are more costly to corporations than internally generated funds, there will typically be a benefit to hedging: hedging adds value to the extent that it helps ensure that a corporation has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. We then argue that this simple observation has wide ranging impli-cations for the design of risk management strategies. We delineate how these strategies should depend on such factors as shocks to investment and financing opportunities. We also discuss exchange rate hedging strategies for multinationals, as well as strategies involving "nonlinear" instruments like options.

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

The steady state and transitional dynamics of two-sector models of endogenous growth are analyzed in this paper. We describe necessary conditions for endogenous growth. The conditions allow us to reduce the dynamics of the solution to a system with one state-like and two control-like variables. We analyze the determinants of the long run growth rate. We use the Time-Elimination Method to analyze the transitional dynamics of the models. We find that there are transitions in real time if the point-in-time production possibility frontier is strictly concave, which occurs, for example, if the two production functions are different or if there are decreasing point-in-time returns in any of the sectors. We also show that if the models have a transition in real time, the models are globally saddle path stable. We find that the wealth or consumption smoothing effect tends to dominate the substitution or real wage effect so that the transition from relatively low levels of physical capital is carried over through high work effort rather than high savings. We develop some empirical implications. We show that the models predict conditional convergence in that, in a cross section, the growth rate is predicted to be negatively related to initial income but only after some measure of human capital is held constant. Thus, the models are consistent with existing empirical cross country evidence.

This study reviews the use of outside informants-individuals not employed in the firm being studied-in strategy research reported in major journals. We empirically explored the expertness of these informants in terms of interrater reliability and accuracy of their ratings compared to those provided by insiders. Four groups of outside informants in the airline industry-consultants, security analysts, stakeholders, and academics- and senior airline executives whose companies initiated certain competitive moves rated strategic attributes associated with those moves. Informants in each group manifested high interrater reliability. Of the outsiders, analysts were the most accurate and were highly reliable, and academics were highly reliable and as accurate as consultants and stakeholders.