Abstract This paper provides evidence that “illusory correlations”—a well-documented source of cognitive bias—lead some agents to be imperfectly rational noise traders. We focus on the head-and-shoulders chart pattern, considered by technical analysts to provide one of the most reliable trading signals. Our findings indicate that the pattern is associated with a substantial rise in trading volume even though it does not profitably predict directional movements. We further substantiate the connection between head-and-shoulders trading and imperfectly rational noise trading by showing that the pattern is associated with lower bid-ask spreads.

We develop a model where: (i) banks take deposits and make investments; (ii) their liabilities facilitate third-party transactions. Other models have (i) or (ii), not both, although we argue they are intimately connected: we show that they both emerge from limited commitment. We describe an environment, characterize desirable allocations, and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements. Banks are essential: without them, the set of feasible allocations is inferior. As a technical contribution, we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions, show they involve backloading, and analyse how this interacts with banking. We also confront the theory with economic history.

This paper uses insights from behavioral economics to explain a particularly surprising borrowing phenomenon: One in six undergraduate students offered interest-free loans turn them down. Models of impulse control predict that students may optimally reject subsidized loans to avoid excessive consumption during school. Using the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), we investigate students' take-up decisions and identify a group of students for whom the loans create an especially tempting liquidity increase. Students who would receive the loan in cash are significantly more likely to turn it down, suggesting that consumers choose to limit their liquidity in economically meaningful situations.

ABSTRACT Using U.S.‐based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate decision rights in response to their evolving environments. We find that a mismatch between the location of decision rights and a firm's environment is associated with weak firm performance. We also show that the likelihood a parent company will alter the assignment of decision rights to a subsidiary is increasing in the extent of a mismatch although this likelihood is decreasing in the strength of the subsidiary's performance.

Abstract The trading of shares of the same firm in multiple markets has become common over the last 30 years, but there is little empirical evidence on the extent to which investors actively exploit multimarket environments. We introduce a volume-based measure of multimarket trading to address this question. Analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, we find higher multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for firms evaluating the benefits of cross listing and for markets competing for order flow.

This paper investigates factors associated with high‐quality Enterprise Risk Management ( ERM ) programs in financial services firms, and whether ERM quality enhances performance and signals credibility to the financial markets. ERM , developed with the assistance of the accounting profession, provides a framework and plan to integrate management of all sources of risk. Challenged by measurement difficulties common to research on management control systems, prior ERM studies present mixed findings. Using ERM quality ratings of financial companies by Standard & Poor's, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with greater complexity, less resource constraint, and better corporate governance. Controlling for such characteristics, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with improved accounting performance. Results show a market reaction to signals of enhanced management control from initial ERM quality ratings and rating revisions, and a stronger response to earnings surprises for firms with higher ERM quality. Focusing on the recent global financial crisis, our analysis suggests that there is no relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to and during the market collapse. However, returns of higher ERM quality companies are higher during the market rebound. Overall, results reveal that firm performance and value are enhanced by high‐quality controls that integrate risk management efforts across the firm, enabling better oversight of managers' risk‐taking behavior and aligning that behavior with the strategic direction of the company.

Abstract A heated debate exists as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions are indicative of earnings management. While many studies attribute discontinuities in earnings distributions to earnings management, other studies argue that earnings discontinuities are artifacts of sample selection and research design. Overall, there is limited direct evidence of a connection between earnings discontinuities and earnings management. In this study, we provide direct evidence linking earnings management to earnings discontinuities for a sample of firms that settle securities class action lawsuits and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period. We compare the distribution of restated (“unmanaged”) earnings to originally reported (“managed”) earnings. We find that discontinuities are not present in the distribution of analyst forecast errors and earnings changes using unmanaged earnings but are present using managed earnings. The discontinuity in the earnings level distribution is attenuated, but not eliminated, on an unmanaged basis. These shifts among our sample of firms are caused by earnings management and cannot be explained by sample selection or research design issues. Our findings are important because many studies use earnings discontinuities as a proxy for intentional earnings manipulations and we provide the first direct evidence of a link between these two phenomena.

Abstract We test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

When a firm cross-lists its shares in segmented markets, the price of the first issued share, as a reference, plays both an informational and anchoring role in pricing the second issued share. We develop a model illustrating the dual-role. Empirically, we examine a group of Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then domestic A-shares, for which the anchoring effect adds to the A-share underpricing. Consistent with the model predictions, we find that the A-share underpricing is positively related to the difference in costs of capital in the two segmented markets, and that this positive association is weaker when participants are less likely to resort to the anchoring heuristic and when the A-share valuation involves less uncertainty.