This article provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between technology and firms’ global sourcing strategies. Using new data on U.S. firms’ decisions to contract for manufacturing services from domestic or foreign suppliers, I show that a firm’s adoption of communication technology between 2002 and 2007 is associated with a 3.1 point increase in its probability of fragmentation. The effect of firm technology also differs significantly across industries; in 2007, it is 20% higher, relative to the mean, in industries with production specifications that are easier to codify in an electronic format. These patterns suggest that technology lowers coordination costs, though its effect is disproportionately higher for domestic rather than foreign sourcing. The larger impact on domestic fragmentation highlights its importance as an alternative to offshoring, and can be explained by complementarities between technology and worker skill. High technology firms and industries are more likely to source from high human capital countries, and the differential impact of technology across industries is strongly increasing in country human capital.

Abstract We use Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule changes to show that regulatory oversight reduces return misreporting by hedge funds. Specifically, we use a 2004 rule change that expanded SEC oversight of hedge funds and the 2006 revocation of this rule. Differences-in-differences tests show that, following the rule change, misreporting by newly regulated funds decreased. After revocation, funds that exited the regulatory system increased misreporting relative to funds that remained registered. Placebo tests show no change in misreporting by foreign funds exempt from the rule change. We show that regulatory oversight increased the level of flows and decreased the sensitivity of flows to underperformance.

Abstract We present a real options model of a firm’s make-or-buy decision under demand uncertainty. “Making” is subject to decreasing returns to scale, fixed costs, and capital investment. “Buying” happens at a fixed price and requires no investment. Three distinct procurement regimes endogenously arise: buying, making, or concurrent sourcing for, respectively, low, intermediate, and high demand. Capital constraints encourage buying or concurrent sourcing. Operating leverage peaks when the firm switches between buying and making, and it is lowest (and negative) at the switch between making and concurrent sourcing. This non-monotonic pattern mirrors and drives the behavior of the firm’s beta.

We investigate a simple dynamical model for the systemic risk caused by the use of Value-at-Risk, as mandated by Basel II. The model consists of a bank with a leverage target and an unleveraged fundamentalist investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered volatility. The parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where the system has a fixed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable region, characterized by cycles with chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable region. A calibration of parameters to data puts the model in region (ii). In this region there is a slowly building price bubble, resembling the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis, followed by a crash resembling the crisis, with a period of approximately 10–15 years. We dub this the Basel leverage cycle. To search for an optimal leverage control policy we propose a criterion based on the ability to minimize risk for a given average leverage. Our model allows us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage increases when volatility increases. We find the best policy depends on the market impact of the bank. Basel II is optimal when the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and leverage is low; in the opposite limit where the bank is large and leverage is high the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage. In the latter regime systemic risk can be dramatically decreased by lowering the leverage target adjustment speed of the banks. While our model does not show that the financial crisis and the period leading up to it were due to VaR risk management policies, it does suggest that it could have been caused by VaR risk management, and that the housing bubble may have just been the spark that triggered the crisis.

Abstract We test for the presence of a systematic tail risk premium in the cross section of expected returns by applying a measure of the sensitivity of assets to extreme market downturns, the tail beta. Empirically, historical tail betas help predict the future performance of stocks in extreme market downturns. During a market crash, stocks with historically high tail betas suffer losses that are approximately 2 to 3 times larger than their low-tail-beta counterparts. However, we find no evidence of a premium associated with tail betas. The theoretically additive and empirically persistent tail betas can help assess portfolio tail risks.

This paper analyzes the role of establishments in the upward trend in dispersion of earnings that has become a central topic in economic analysis and policy debate. It decomposes changes in the variance of log earnings among individuals into the part due to changes in earnings among establishments and the part due to changes in earnings within establishments. The main finding is that much of the 1970s–2010s increase in earnings inequality results from increased dispersion of the earnings among the establishments where individuals work. Our results direct attention to the role of establishment-level pay setting and economic adjustments in earnings inequality.

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.

This study investigates how Schwartz’s cultural dimensions of embeddedness and mastery affect the corporate cost of debt through bankruptcy risk and sensitivity to agency activity channels. Using data from 33 countries, we find a strong and robust negative relation between embeddedness and the cost of debt. The estimated relation between mastery and the corporate cost of debt is negative and significant in most of the tests. Further analyses reveal that the development of financial intermediation and the enforcement of insider trading law moderate the relation between culture and the cost of debt. Confirming our hypotheses, we document that embeddedness is negatively related to bankruptcy risk and sensitivity to agency activity. We find that mastery is positively related to bankruptcy risk across countries as well, but this relation is weaker. We also show that mastery is positively related to sensitivity to agency activity among countries with highly leveraged firms.

Abstract We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision, or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share maximizers. They can propose any policy that is resource-feasible and incentive-compatible. They can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate. We prove two main results. First, the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus-maximizing and hence first-best Pareto-efficient. Second, there is a surplus-maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare-maximizing policy. Thus, in our model, policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible.