We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.