To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
3 results ✕ Clear filters

Trading Volume and Time Varying Betas

Review of Finance 2022 26(1), 79-116 open access
Abstract I show that increased turnover accompanies changes in stocks’ risk exposures. A one standard deviation decrease in a stock’s market beta increases turnover as much as 25%. The sensitivity of turnover to beta changes has grown over time. Market beta changes explain as much as 5% of the monthly cross-sectional variation in turnover. VAR decompositions of returns show turnover is more strongly associated with discount rate news than cash flow news. This mechanism provides a new channel for turnover combined with realized returns to predict long horizon returns and cash flow changes. Further, this mechanism can amplify many prior explored motives for trade.

Where Does the Predictability from Sorting on Returns of Economically Linked Firms Come From?

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2021 56(8), 2634-2658 open access
Abstract Cross-firm predictability among economically linked firms can arise when both firms exhibit their own momentum and their returns are contemporaneously correlated. We show that cross-firm predictability can last up to 10 years, which is hard to reconcile with an interpretation of slow information diffusion. However, it is consistent with the economically linked firms’ commonality in momentum. The contribution of each source can be found by decomposing leaders’ returns into the predictable (momentum) and news components. Sorting on each, we find that both sources contribute almost equally to 1-month predictability, whereas commonality in momentum is solely responsible for longer-horizon cross-firm predictability.

How Much Do Directors Influence Firm Value?

Review of Financial Studies 2020 33(4), 1818-1847 open access
Abstract The value a director provides to a firm is empirically difficult to establish. We estimate that value by exploiting the commonality in idiosyncratic returns of firms linked by a director and show that, on average, a director’s influence causes variation in firm value of almost 1% per year. The return commonality is not due to industry or other observable economic links. Variation in the availability of information on shared directors and a placebo test exploiting the timing of shared directors provide further identification. The results also imply that the directorial labor market does not fully assess directors in real time. (JEL G34, G14)