If the asset market is complete, then the difference between foreign and domestic agents’ log intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRSs) equals the log change in the real exchange rate. This equation is frequently used to argue that changes in real exchange rates reflect differences between agents’ required compensation for exposure to asset return uncertainty. We show that the relative returns on frictionlessly traded assets are only reflected in the common component of agents’ IMRSs, not in differences. Instead, when this equation does offer insights, frictions in the goods market are the source of economic distinction between agents. Received December 10, 2013; editorial decision November 5, 2018 by Editor Geert Bekaert.

Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) argue that the excess returns to borrowing US dollars and lending in foreign currency “compensate US investors for taking on more US consumption growth risk,” yet the stochastic discount factor corresponding to their benchmark model is approximately uncorrelated with the returns they study. Hence, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that their model explains none of the cross sectional variation of the expected returns. Given this finding, and other evidence, I argue that the forward premium puzzle remains a puzzle. JEL: C58, E21, F31, G11, G12

In Burnside and Dollar (2000) we used standard regression techniques from the growth literature to measure the effect of foreign aid on growth. The main finding in our paper was that the effect of foreign aid on growth depended on the macroeconomic policies of recipient countries. In this issue, William Easterly et al. (2004), challenge the robustness of our result to new data. Before commenting on their findings it is useful to review the basis of our original findings. Our paper focused on three versions of a panel growth regression, estimated using data for 51 countries, and six four-year periods, from 1970 to 1993. These regressions may be summarized as:

This paper uses a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid, economic policies, and growth of per capita GDP. We find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies. Good policies are ones that are themselves important for growth. The quality of policy has only a small impact on the allocation of aid. Our results suggest that aid would be more effective if it were more systematically conditioned on good policy.

We propose a novel pricing factor for currency returns motivated by the market microstructure literature. Our factor aggregates order flow data to provide a measure of buying and selling pressure related to conventional currency trading strategies. It successfully prices the cross-section of currency returns sorted on the basis of forward discount and momentum. The association between our factor and currency returns differs according to the customer segment of the foreign exchange market. In particular, it appears that financial customers are risk-takers in the market, while nonfinancial customers serve as liquidity providers.

We study the properties of the carry trade, a currency speculation strategy in which an investor borrows low-interest-rate currencies and lends high-interest-rate currencies. This strategy generates payoffs that are on average large and uncorrelated with traditional risk factors. We argue that these payoffs reflect a peso problem. The underlying peso event features high values of the stochastic discount factor rather than very large negative payoffs.

This paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. We articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. We present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis.

This paper investigates the sensitivity of Solow residual based measures of technology shocks to labor-hoarding behavior. Using a structural model of labor hoarding and the identifying restriction that innovations to technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations in government consumption, the authors estimate the fraction of the variability of the Solow residual that is due to technology shocks. Their results support the view that a significant proportion of movements in the Solow residual are artifa cts of labor-hoarding behavior. Specifically, the authors estimate that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than that implied by standard real business cycle models.