We argue theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater (industrial) automation, because it creates a shortage of middle-aged workers specializing in manual production tasks. We show that demographic change is associated with greater adoption of robots and other automation technologies across countries and with more robotics-related activities across U.S. commuting zones. We also document more automation innovation in countries undergoing faster aging. Our directed technological change model predicts that the response of automation technologies to aging should be more pronounced in industries that rely more on middle-aged workers and those that present greater opportunities for automation and that productivity should improve and the labor share should decline relatively in industries that are more amenable to automation. The evidence supports all four of these predictions.

We document that between 50% and 70% of changes in the U.S. wage structure over the last four decades are accounted for by relative wage declines of worker groups specialized in routine tasks in industries experiencing rapid automation. We develop a conceptual framework where tasks across industries are allocated to different types of labor and capital. Automation technologies expand the set of tasks performed by capital, displacing certain worker groups from jobs for which they have comparative advantage. This framework yields a simple equation linking wage changes of a demographic group to the task displacement it experiences. We report robust evidence in favor of this relationship and show that regression models incorporating task displacement explain much of the changes in education wage differentials between 1980 and 2016. The negative relationship between wage changes and task displacement is unaffected when we control for changes in market power, deunionization, and other forms of capital deepening and technology unrelated to automation. We also propose a methodology for evaluating the full general equilibrium effects of automation, which incorporate induced changes in industry composition and ripple effects due to task reallocation across different groups. Our quantitative evaluation explains how major changes in wage inequality can go hand‐in‐hand with modest productivity gains.

Rich behavioural biases, mistakes, and limits on rational decision-making are often thought to make equilibrium analysis much more intractable. We establish that this is not the case in the context of one-sector growth models such as Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans or Bewley–Aiyagari models. We break down the response of the economy to a change in the environment or policy into two parts: the direct response at the given (pre-tax) prices, and the equilibrium response which plays out as prices change. Our main result demonstrates that under weak regularity conditions, regardless of the details of behavioural preferences, mistakes and constraints on decision-making, the long-run equilibrium will involve a greater capital-labour ratio if and only if the direct response (from the corresponding consumption-saving model) involves an increase in aggregate savings. One implication of this result is that, from a qualitative point of view, behavioural biases matter for long-run equilibrium if and only if they change the direction of the direct response. We provide detailed illustrations of how this result can be applied and generate new insights using models of misperceptions, self-control and temptation, and naive and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting.

We examine the concerns that new technologies will render labor redundant in a framework in which tasks previously performed by labor can be automated and new versions of existing tasks, in which labor has a comparative advantage, can be created. In a static version where capital is fixed and technology is exogenous, automation reduces employment and the labor share, and may even reduce wages, while the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects. Our full model endogenizes capital accumulation and the direction of research toward automation and the creation of new tasks. If the long-run rental rate of capital relative to the wage is sufficiently low, the long-run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks. Otherwise, there exists a stable balanced growth path in which the two types of innovations go hand-in-hand. Stability is a consequence of the fact that automation reduces the cost of producing using labor, and thus discourages further automation and encourages the creation of new tasks. In an extension with heterogeneous skills, we show that inequality increases during transitions driven both by faster automation and the introduction of new tasks, and characterize the conditions under which inequality stabilizes in the long run.

Several recent theories emphasize the negative effects of an aging population on economic growth, either because of the lower labor force participation and productivity of older workers or because aging will create an excess of savings over desired investment, leading to secular stagnation. We show that there is no such negative relationship in the data. If anything, countries experiencing more rapid aging have grown more in recent decades. We suggest that this counterintuitive finding might reflect the more rapid adoption of automation technologies in countries undergoing more pronounced demographic changes and provide evidence and theoretical underpinnings for this argument.

We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited. Conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution: Bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake, and is thus uninformative of the opposing group's type. The agents then experiment with a good action, restarting the cycle.

We live in an unprecedented age of globalization, where technology, ideas, factors of production, and goods are increasingly mobile across national boundaries. The current wave of globalization is distinguished from previous ones in part because of the major role of infor mation technology. Nevertheless, globalization is not irreversible. Openness to international trade, finance, and technology is a choice that countries make, and despite the facilitating role of information technology, many countries, even many leading players in the world econ omy including the United States, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, could decide to close their borders. A major cause of the end of the previ ous (also historically unprecedented ) nineteenth century wave of globalization was disillusion ment with the international economic order, in

This paper constructs a model of non-balanced economic growth. The main economic force is the combination of differences in factor proportions and capital deepening. Capital deepening tends to increase the relative output of the sector with a greater capital share, but simultaneously induces a reallocation of capital and labor away from that sector. We first illustrate this force using a general two-sector model. We then investigate it further using a class of models with constant elasticity of substitution between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production functions in each sector. In this class of models, non-balanced growth is shown to be consistent with an asymptotic equilibrium with constant interest rate and capital share in national income. We also show that for realistic parameter values, the model generates dynamics that are broadly consistent with US data. In particular, the model generates more rapid growth of employment in less capital-intensive sectors, more rapid growth of real output in more capital-intensive sectors and aggregate behavior in line with the Kaldor facts. Finally, we construct and analyze a model of "non-balanced endogenous growth," which extends the main results of the paper to an economy with endogenous anddirected technical change. This model shows that equilibrium will typically involve endogenous non-balanced technological progress.

We consider infinite-horizon economies populated by a continuum of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This framework contains models of saving and capital accumulation with incomplete markets in the spirit of works by Bewley, Aiyagari, and Huggett; models of entry, exit, and industry dynamics in the spirit of Hopenhayn’s work; and dynamic models of occupational choice and search models as special cases. Robust and easy-to-apply comparative statics results are established with respect to exogenous parameters as well as various kinds of changes in the Markov processes governing the law of motion of the idiosyncratic shocks.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to accommodate disabled workers and outlaws discrimination against the disabled in hiring, firing, and pay. Although the ADA was meant to increase the employment of the disabled, the net theoretical effects are ambiguous. For men of all working ages and women under 40, Current Population Survey data show a sharp drop in the employment of disabled workers after the ADA went into effect. Although the number of disabled individuals receiving disability transfers increased at the same time, the decline in employment of the disabled does not appear to be explained by increasing transfers alone, leaving the ADA as a likely cause. Consistent with this view, the effects of the ADA appear larger in medium‐size firms, possibly because small firms were exempt from the ADA. The effects are also larger in states with more ADA‐related discrimination charges.