This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.

This study examines the association between firms’ intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms’ financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts’ forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts’ forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm’s level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm’s future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm’s intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst’s forecast increases with a firm’s intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high‐technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D‐driven high‐tech manufacturers.

This study explores whether an increase in the size of firms’ reporting networks (the number of industry peer firms reporting in comparable standards) improves the quality of analysts’ information environments. We exploit the effect of the 2005 mandatory adoption of IFRS around the world on U.S. firms, as IFRS adoption did not directly affect U.S. firms but increased the size of their reporting networks. We document that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with a significantly larger improvement in the quality of analysts’ information environment for U.S. firms with relatively few domestic industry peers than for other U.S. firms. Further, we show that there is a larger increase in the frequency with which analysts’ research reports for U.S. firms with few domestic peers mention IFRS-adopting EU industry peer firms. Our results provide evidence that mandatory reporting regulations that increase reporting comparability can result in positive information externalities from information network effects.