Abstract We present a model in which investment capacity is reallocated in response to aggregate shocks and examine the resulting general equilibrium effects. The theory predicts a positive association between aggregate liquidity shocks, cost of capital, and conservative accounting. When capital becomes scarce, the accounting system is designed to preserve collateral, which depletes the supply of traded capital and leads to a higher cost of capital. The economy may accelerate small shocks with large (discontinuous) readjustments in financial reporting policies, cost of capital, and investment activity. We show that accounting policies set by firms to increase their market value may imply multiple equilibria, with self‐fulfilling inefficient equilibria exhibiting excessive collateral requirements and reduced aggregate investment.

ABSTRACT Does managing the production of information add value in economic environments where a manager may claim to be uninformed and withhold unfavorable news? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, controlling how evidence is organized, within a voluntary disclosure framework. Information has productive consequences because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision. The optimal reporting strategy features coarse information at the most unfavorable reported event if and only if the firm bears penalties for nondisclosure or positive disclosure costs. The model demonstrates the optimality of imprecise information over bad news in a voluntary disclosure environment, and that such imprecision increases the quality of public signals after considering strategic disclosure effects.