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Related Lending

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2003 118(1), 231-268 open access
In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled data set for Mexico. Related lending is prevalent (20 percent of commercial loans) and takes place on better terms than arm's-length lending (annual interest rates are 4 percentage points lower). Related loans are 33 percent more likely to default and, when they do, have lower recovery rates (30 percent less) than unrelated ones. The evidence for Mexico in the 1990s supports the view that in some important settings related lending is a manifestation of looting.

The Regulation of Entry

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002 117(1), 1-37 open access
Countries differ significantly in the way in which they regulate the entry of new businesses. To meet government requirements for starting to operate a business in Austria, an entrepreneur must complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 business days and pay US$11,612 in government fees. To do the same, an entrepreneur in Bolivia needs to follow 20 different procedures, pay US$2,696 in fees to the government and wait at least 82 business days to acquire the necessary permits. In contrast, an entrepreneur in Canada can finish the process in roughly 2 days by paying US$280 in government fees and completing only 2 procedures.

The Regulation of Labor

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004 119(4), 1339-1382 open access
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.