We study a generous program to promote the adoption of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems through subsidies on future electricity production, rather than through upfront investment subsidies. We develop a tractable dynamic model of new technology adoption, also accounting for local market heterogeneity. We identify the discount factor from demand responses to variation that shifts expected future but not current utilities. Despite the massive adoption, we find that households significantly discounted the future benefits from the new technology. This implies that an upfront investment subsidy program would have promoted the technology at a much lower budgetary cost.

We study entry restrictions in a private monopoly: the Latin notary system. Under this widespread system, the state grants notaries exclusive rights to certify important economic transactions, including real estate. To uncover the current policy goals behind the geographic entry restrictions, we develop an empirical entry model that incorporates a spatial demand model and a multioutput production model. We find that the entry restrictions serve primarily producer interests and give only a small weight to consumer surplus. We show how reform would generate considerable welfare improvements and imply a substantial redistribution toward consumers without threatening geographic coverage.

We extend BLP's aggregate discrete-choice model of product differentiation to create more flexibility in the price functional form. We apply a Box-Cox specification, which relaxes the typical unit demand assumption and creates flexibility on demand curvature. The model provides a unifying framework for mixed logit and mixed CES models, while remaining computationally tractable. We provide an illustrative application to the ready-to-eat cereals market. This shows that the cross-sectional relation between price elasticities and average prices per product is more in line with descriptive elasticity patterns, and that substitution between product pairs may be affected to some extent.

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents’ fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their strategies are consistent with a breakdown of tacit semi-collusion: before entry, the incumbents could successfully coordinate on restricting product variety to avoid cannibalization; after entry, this outcome became harder to sustain because of increased business stealing incentives. Consumers gained considerably from the added variety and, to a lesser extent, from the incumbents’ price responses.

The success of new technologies depends on both the firms' investment and consumers' usage decisions. We study this problem in a shared ATM network. Inefficiencies may arise because banks coordinate investment, and consumers may not make proper use of the network. Based on an empirical model of ATM investment and demand, we find that banks substantially underinvested in ATMs, in contrast with earlier findings of strategic overinvestment in the United States. Furthermore, ATM usage was too low, because regulation prohibited fees for cash withdrawals. A direct promotion of investment improves welfare, but fees for branch cash withdrawals would be more effective.