Most approaches to entrepreneurship assume that entrepreneurial control over their inventions is critical for success and, in turn, for incentives. Such control is usually supported by regulations that protect intellectual property including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. Each give the entrepreneurs control over who can appropriate value from their activities. However, we note that another, distinct path exists for appropriation by entrepreneurs' execution. Execution forgoes the formal protection from control instead of a more rapid approach to market in the pursuit of capabilities that will allow entrepreneurs to compete with others in the future rather than block their activities per se. We characterize the conditions under which one path is preferred to another and present evidence from university startups delineating the tradeoffs at the heart of our theoretical approach.

Since its launch in 2009 much has been written about Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and blockchains. While the discussions initially took place mostly on blogs and other popular media, we now are witnessing the emergence of a growing body of rigorous academic research on these topics. By the nature of the phenomenon analyzed, this research spans many academic disciplines including macroeconomics, law and economics, and computer science. This survey focuses on the microeconomics of crypto-currencies themselves. What drives their supply, demand, trading price, and competition amongst them? This literature has been emerging over the past decade and the purpose of this paper is to summarize its main findings so as to establish a base upon which future research can be conducted. (JEL D82, E42, G12)

This is a submitted manuscript of an article published by the American Economic Association in the American Economic Review.