We contribute to identifying proxies for the information set of investors in financial markets. We show that the marketwide price-dividend ratio highly correlates with inflation and labor market variables that also forecast consumption, dividend, and GDP growth, but not with aggregate consumption or GDP growth. Our model with learning from inflation and wage earnings rationalizes the moments of consumption and dividend growth, market return, the price-dividend ratio, real and nominal term structures, the low predictive power of the price-dividend ratio for consumption and dividends, and the dynamics of the price-dividend ratio, unlike a nested model with learning from consumption alone.

We derive equilibrium restrictions on the range of the transaction prices of American options on the stock market index and index futures. Trading over the lifetime of the options is accounted for, in contrast to earlier single-period results. The bounds on the reservation purchase price of American puts and the reservation write price of American calls are tight. We allow the market to be incomplete and imperfect due to the presence of proportional transaction costs in trading the underlying security and due to bid-ask spreads in option prices. The bounds may be derived for any given probability distribution of the return of the underlying security and admit price jumps and stochastic volatility. We assume that at least some of the traders maximize a time- separable utility function. The bounds are derived by applying the weak notion of stochastic dominance and are independent of a trader's particular utility function and initial portfolio position.

We construct a panel of S&P 500 Index call and put option portfolios, daily adjusted to maintain targeted maturity, moneyness, and unit market beta, and test multi-factor pricing models. The standard linear factor methodology is applicable because the monthly portfolio returns have low skewness and are close to normal. We hypothesize that any one of crisis-related factors incorporating price jumps, volatility jumps, and liquidity (along with the market) explains the cross-sectional variation in returns. Our hypothesis is not rejected, even when the factor premia are constrained to equal the corresponding premia in the cross-section of equities. The alphas of short-maturity out-of-the-money puts become economically and statistically insignificant.

We document widespread violations of stochastic dominance by one-month S&P 500 index call options market over 1986-2006. These violations imply that a trader can improve her expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade. We allow the market to be incomplete and also imperfect by introducing transaction costs and bid-ask spreads. Even though pre-crash option prices conform to the Black-Scholes-Merton model reasonably well, they are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is estimated from time-series data even with a variety of statistical adjustments. Even though there are fewer violations by OTM calls than by ITM calls, there are still substantial violations by OTM calls, contradicting the inference drawn from the observed implied volatility smile that the problem primarily lies with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution. Most of the violations by post-crash options are not due to the smile being too steep: options are underpriced over 1988-1995 and overpriced over 1997-2006. The decrease in violations over the post-crash period 1988-1995 is followed by a substantial increase in violations over 1997-2006. These results do not support the hypothesis that the options market is becoming more rational over time. Current draft: November 10, 2006 JEL classification: G13 Keywords: Derivative pricing; volatility smile, incomplete markets, transaction costs; index options; stochastic dominance bounds We thank workshop participants at the German Finance Society Meetings 2004, the Bachelier 2004 Congress, the EFA 2005 Meetings, the Frontiers of Finance conference 2006, the Alberta/Calgary 2006 conference, the Universities of Chicago, Iowa, Southern California, Maryland, Texas-Austin, Torino, Utah and Concordia, Laval, New York, Princeton and St. Gallen Universities and, in particular, Yacine Ait-Sahalia, David Bates, Duke Bristow, Larry Harris, Steve Heston, Jim Hodder, Mark Loewenstein, Matthew Richardson, Jeffrey Russell, Hersh Shefrin and Greg Willard for their insightful comments and constructive criticism. We also thank Michal Czerwonko for excellent research assistance. We remain responsible for errors and omissions. Constantinides acknowledges financial support from the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago and Perrakis from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected].

American options on the S&P 500 index futures that violate the stochastic dominance bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2009) from 1983 to 2006 are identified as potentially profitable trades. Call bid prices more frequently violate their upper bound than put bid prices do, while violations of the lower bounds by ask prices are infrequent. In out‐of‐sample tests of stochastic dominance, the writing of options that violate the upper bound increases the expected utility of any risk‐averse investor holding the market and cash, net of transaction costs and bid‐ask spreads. The results are economically significant and robust.

Earlier research finds correlation between sentiment and future economic growth, but disagrees on the channel that explains this result. We shed new light on this issue by exploiting cross-sectional variation in country size and market efficiency. We find that sentiment shocks in the largest advanced economies increase economic activity, but only temporarily and without affecting productivity. Conversely, sentiment shocks in smaller or less advanced economies predict prolonged economic growth and a corresponding increase in productivity. The results support the view that sentiment can create economic booms, although only in economies where sentiment and fundamentals are harder to disentangle.