Until the 1970s, both banks and nonfinancial corporations relied on performance targets linked to their earnings per share (EPS). Over the next few decades, banks rapidly changed to emphasize return on equity (ROE) as a performance target. Investors seem aware of this change because ROE growth (EPS growth) better explains banks’ (nonfinancials’) stock market values. Also, manager compensation linked to ROE is more common for banks than for nonfinancials. This paper presents a model of a bank subject to fixed-rate deposit insurance and facing increasing competition that erodes its charter value. When the bank chooses its capital to maximize its shareholder value, its performance based on ROE appears better than its performance based on EPS. Thus, the increase in competition that started in the 1970s, along with fixed-rate deposit insurance, may explain banks’ growing preference for ROE over EPS as a performance target.

Contingent convertibles (CoCos) are intended to either convert to new equity or be written down prior to failure while a bank is a going-concern. Yet, in the first actual test case, CoCos never converted before its bank failed. We develop a model that predicts that CoCos lead to less (more) extreme stock returns and have yields greater than (similar to) standard subordinated debt yields if investors do (do not) expect them to convert or be written down prior to failure. These predictions are tested using data on CoCos issued by European banks during 2011 to 2017. We find evidence that equity conversion CoCos reduce stock return variance and several other measures of downside risk, consistent with the perception that they are going-concern capital. However, we also provide event study evidence that recent regulatory actions reduced the CoCo–subordinated debt yield spread, which indicates a diminished investor belief that CoCos are going-concern capital.

Our model shows that when regulation is based on credit ratings, banks with low charter value maximize shareholder value by minimizing capital and selecting identically rated loans and bonds with the highest systematic risk. This regulatory arbitrage is possible if the credit spreads on same-rated loans and bonds are greater when their systematic risk (debt beta) is higher. We empirically confirm this relationship between credit spreads, ratings, and debt betas. We also show that banks with lower capital select syndicated loans with higher debt betas and credit spreads. Banks with lower charter value choose overall assets with higher systematic risk. Received July 27, 2016; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.

Like security prices, retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and “even” fractions. However, explanations for security price clustering are incompatible with deposit rate clustering. A theory based on the limited recall of retail depositors is proposed. It predicts that banks tend to set rates at integers and that rates are “sticky” at these levels. The propensity for integer rates increases with the level of wholesale interest rates and deposit market concentration. When banks set noninteger rates, rates are more likely to be just above, rather than just below, integers. The paper finds substantial empirical support for the theory's implications.