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The Effects of Losing a Business Group Affiliation

Review of Financial Studies 2019 32(8), 3036-3074 open access
We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, leaving some firms as stand-alone firms. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the other firm had high tangibility. Consistent with capital misallocation in groups, the reduction in leverage is stronger in firms that had low (high) profitability (leverage) relative to industry peers. Received July 3, 2017; editorial decision April 7, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang.

How Do Foreign Labor Regulations Affect Firms’ Operating Strategies?

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(2), 910-947 open access
We examine how changes in foreign labor regulations affect U.S. multinationals’ operating strategies. We show that firms with integrated operations in countries where labor regulations become tighter tend to establish arm’s-length relations with local business partners in that nation. The substitution between integrated and arm’s-length operations is stronger toward joint ventures than suppliers and weaker in the presence of financial constraints. Our findings are consistent with the idea that when firms find it harder to terminate their workers in integrated operations, they change to an operating model where it is easier to replace or discontinue business partners instead of employees.

Capital structure under collusion

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2021 45, 100854 open access
We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.