An important piece of the capital structure puzzle has been missing, and it is not a contracting friction. It is recognition that managers do not have sufficient knowledge to optimize capital structure with any real precision. The literature critique in this paper i) identifies the conceptual sources of the main empirical failures of the leading models of capital structure and ii) shows how those failures can be repaired by taking into account imperfect managerial knowledge and several other factors. The analysis yields a compact set of principles for thinking about capital structure in an empirically supported way.

Analysis of 60 proxy contests for seats on the boards of exchange-listed firms during 1978–1985 shows that three years after the contest less than one-fifth of the sample firms remain independent, publicly held corporations run by the same management team. Proxy contests are typically followed by managerial resignations, even when dissidents fail to obtain a majority of board seats, and are often followed by sale or liquidation of the firm. The average stockholder wealth gains associated with proxy contests are largely attributable to gains by companies in which dissident activity leads to sale or liquidation.

This paper studies accounting choice in 76 NYSE firms with persistent losses and dividend reductions (40% forced by binding covenants). We find that managers' accounting choices primarily reflect their firms' financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income. Firms with and without binding covenants exhibit minor accrual differences in the ten years before the dividend reduction. In the dividend reduction and following three years, the full sample exhibits large negative accruals that likely reflect the fact that 87% of sample firms engage in contractual renegotiations -with lenders, unions, government, and/or management-that provide incentives to reduce earnings.

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.

This article documents new and empirically important interactions between cash-balance and leverage dynamics. Cash ratios typically vary widely over extended horizons, with dynamics remarkably similar to (and complementary with) those of capital structure. Leverage and cash dynamics interact approximately as predicted by the internal-versus-external funding regimes in Myers and Majluf (1984, J. Finan. Econ., 13, 187–221.). Leverage is quite volatile when cash ratios are stable and vice-versa, while net-debt ratios are almost always volatile. Most firms increase leverage sharply as cash balances (internal funds) become scarce. Capital structure models that extend Hennessy and Whited (2005, J. Finan., 60, 1129–1165.) to include cash-balance dynamics explain some, but not all, aspects of the observed relation between cash squeezes and leverage increases.