Using survey data, we analyze institutional investors’ expectations about the future performance of fund managers and the impact of those expectations on asset allocation decisions. We find that institutional investors allocate funds mainly on the basis of fund managers’ past performance and of investment consultants’ recommendations, but not because they extrapolate their expectations from these. This suggests that institutional investors base their investment decisions on the most defensible variables at their disposal and supports the existence of agency considerations in their decision making.

We examine the effects of time-limited disclosure relief under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012. The Act grants newly public firms up to five years of exemptions, and our results suggest that the fixed duration of this relief, as much as its availability, shapes post-IPO behavior. Using an intention-to-treat design, we compare treated firms with smaller reporting companies whose exemptions are similar but carry no fixed expiry date. Equity issuance by treated firms increases significantly as the deadline nears while debt issuance declines, and cash reserves accumulate over the period. Capital expenditure increases relative to controls in the early post-IPO years, while R&D shows no differential response. As expiry approaches, the differential with the control group in internal investment weakens but cash-financed acquisitions accelerate. This shift in investment composition coincides with deteriorating operating performance and declining market valuations relative to IPO levels. Our post-expiry analysis reveals an abrupt reversal in acquisition activity upon transition to full disclosure while internal investment remains unchanged, supporting the argument that pre-expiry behavior was driven by the regulatory timeline rather than natural firm maturation. We conclude that the duration of regulatory relief is as important as its scope in shaping corporate behavior, and that time-limited exemptions from mandatory disclosure can induce anticipatory firm responses that work against the policy's intended objectives.

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.