Counterparty risk could hamper trade and worsen a financial crisis. A central clearing party (CCP) insures traders against counterparty default and thus benefits trade. Default of the CCP however becomes a new systemic risk. CCP risk management does not account for risks associated with crowded positions. This paper proposes a CCP exposure measure based on tail risk in trader portfolios. It identifies and measures crowded risk and assigns it to traders according to the polluter pays principle. CCP data show that crowded positions increase CCP exposure most (about one-third) on turbulent days, when exposure is high already.

This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone indicator. We analyse 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation period 1999–2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones.

The labor market increasingly rewards social skills. Between 1980 and 2012, jobs requiring high levels of social interaction grew by nearly 12 percentage points as a share of the U.S. labor force. Math-intensive but less social jobs—including many STEM occupations—shrank by 3.3 percentage points over the same period. Employment and wage growth were particularly strong for jobs requiring high levels of both math skill and social skills. To understand these patterns, I develop a model of team production where workers “trade tasks” to exploit their comparative advantage. In the model, social skills reduce coordination costs, allowing workers to specialize and work together more efficiently. The model generates predictions about sorting and the relative returns to skill across occupations, which I investigate using data from the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. Using a comparable set of skill measures and covariates across survey waves, I find that the labor market return to social skills was much greater in the 2000s than in the mid-1980s and 1990s.

We test whether ratings are comparable across asset classes. We examine default rates by initial rating, accuracy ratios, migration metrics, instantaneous upgrade and downgrade intensities, and rating changes over bonds’ lives in multivariate regressions. These approaches reveal substantial and persistent differences across broad asset classes, as well as across subcategories of structured finance products. Our results are best explained by variation in rating agency incentives and variation in underlying risk profiles. We conclude that regulations requiring ratings to perform comparably across asset classes will prove difficult to enforce. We advocate instead a regulatory framework that better distinguishes risks and incentives across asset classes.

We develop an empirically based simulation study to test two types of policies designed to control systemic risk: preventive policies targeting capital requirements and mitigation policies targeting default resolution. We find that capital buffers reduce both the number of defaults and the resulting losses. The loss reduction benefit increases as the magnitude of adverse shocks becomes higher. We find that a simple branch-breakup resolution strategy reduces the loss borne by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The mitigation effect becomes higher as the fraction of assets resolved through auctions and auction competitiveness increase.

We analyze whether banks and industrial companies have equal access to debt markets through reputable underwriters and explore the determinants of that matching for both types of firms. Using a sample of European corporate bonds during the years 2003–2013, we find that the odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were about 1.5 times greater for non-financial companies than for banks. The odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were 10.92 times lower for a bank during the crisis. As for the determinants of the matching probability, the marginal effect of the bond size on the matching probability is 1.70 larger for non-financial firms than for banks. Furthermore, the effect of bond size is greater for large non-financial companies than for large banks while the effect of maturity is larger for banks than for non-financial companies.

In this article, we provide a model of the macroeconomic implications of safe asset shortages. In particular, we discuss the emergence of a deflationary safety trap equilibrium with endogenous risk premia. It is an acute form of a liquidity trap, in which the shortage of a specific form of assets, safe assets, as opposed to a general shortage of assets, is the fundamental driving force. At the Zero Lower Bound, our model has a Keynesian cross representation, in which net safe asset supply plays the role of an aggregate demand shifter. Essentially, safety traps correspond to liquidity traps in which the emergence of an endogenous risk premium significantly alters the connection between macroeconomic policy and economic activity. “Helicopter drops” of money, safe public debt issuances, swaps of private risky assets for safe public debt, or increases in the inflation target, stimulate aggregate demand and output, while forward guidance is less effective. The safety trap can be arbitrarily persistent, as in the secular stagnation hypothesis, despite the existence of infinitely lived assets.

The unique regulation of U.S. public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status. Comparing public and private pension funds in the United States, Canada, and Europe, we find that U.S. public pension funds act on their regulatory incentives. U.S. public pension funds with a higher level of underfunding per participant, as well as